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Abstract 
 
The objective of this thesis is to provide both empirical evidence and theoretical 
explanations that will show the positive and negative effects of intrinsic motivation 
and reputational concerns in the public sector. The thesis argues that by having 
intrinsically motivated individuals in the public sector (i.e. individuals that are public 
service motivated), the government can provide higher quality public goods and 
services at a lower cost. The thesis finds empirical evidence for the existence of 
public service motivation and also finds that high extrinsic rewards in the public 
sector deter individuals with high levels of public service motivation from joining the 
public sector. There is also empirical evidence showing that individuals remain public 
service motivated in the long term.  
 
This thesis also investigates whether the reputational concerns of a principal 
(government) can lead to under provision of quality improving effort by contracted 
firms in procurement contracts. The thesis finds that reputational concerns cause the 
decision maker to intervene in procurement projects more frequently than is optimal. 
This then results in the contracted private firm exerting less effort to produce quality 
improving firm specific investments.  
 
Since public service motivation can improve the delivery of public goods and 
services, these findings lead us to conclude that governments must find ways to 
recruit a larger proportion of public service motivated individuals into the public 
sector. These findings also highlight the importance of reputational concerns in the 
decision making process of governments. They show us that reputational concerns 
can have very negative effects on procurement contracts.    
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Introduction 
 
I.1 Motivations 
The public sector is plagued with various incentive problems that manifest themselves 
in the form of cost overruns and/or poor quality in the delivery of public services. 
Economists have attempted to determine the nature and causes of these cost overruns 
and poor quality outcomes in the delivery of public services. This thesis attempts to 
analyze whether of reputational concerns and intrinsic motivation can improve 
performance in the public sector.  
 
I analyse reputational concerns and intrinsic motivation because the public sector 
provides unique challenges that more obvious remedies may not be able to correct.  
For example the role of extrinsic rewards in improving public sector performance has 
been questioned. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) argue that if an agent performs 
several tasks, and how well these tasks are performed is not equally measurable then 
giving explicit incentives may not be efficient. A good example is in teaching. 
Teachers have the choice of whether to invest in effort that will improve the test 
scores of students or effort that gives students other skills such as inquisitiveness and 
curiosity whose performance is difficult to measure. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) 
argue that if teachers are given incentive pay based on exam performance then they 
will exert less of the second type of effort. Thus the overall outcome of incentive pay 
may be undesirable and it may be better to simply give teachers a flat salary. How 
then to further motivate teachers? I consider whether reputational concerns and 
intrinsic motivation can be a further source of motivation, which results in the 
improvement of the delivery of public services.  
 
The literature on public procurement gives several reasons for the existence of 
persistent cost overruns in public procurement. Firstly, cost overruns have been 
attributed to a soft budget constraint problem that exists between the government and 
the contractor. This literature (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003), Dewatripont and 
Maskin (1995), Kornai (1979)) views the government as the supporting organisation 
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and the contractor as the budget constrained organisation.1 The government cannot 
credibly commit not to bail out the contractor when the contractor encounters 
financial problems and as a result the contractor loses the incentive to keep costs low.2  
 
Secondly, cost overruns have been attributed to design and project complexity. Bajari 
and Tadelis (2001) argue that projects that are simple should be procured using fixed 
price contracts as their designs have a high degree of completeness and so are 
unlikely to require costly renegotiation. Projects with complex designs, and therefore 
have a high degree of incompleteness and require alteration and so costly 
renegotiation. Such projects are better provided using cost plus contracts. 
 
Cost overruns have also been attributed to a lack of competition in the bidding stage 
for contracts. Ganuza (2000) argues that low levels of competition in the bidding 
stage will result in a lower level of design specification which leads a higher 
likelihood of cost overruns once the project has begun.  
 
The literature attributes firms reneging on quality to contract incompleteness. Private 
firms contracted to the government exploit contract incompleteness, producing low 
quality services and goods in order to save on costs (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
Reputation building has been shown to create incentives to keep costs low and 
improve quality, at least in the short term. Lewis (1986) argues that contractors have 
an incentive to keep costs low in the beginning stages of a project. However, after a 
number of stages have passed, the sponsor is “locked in” and cannot terminate the 
project. When this happens, the contractor no longer has an incentive to keep cost 
                                                 
1 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) present a model where due to adverse selection; projects that are 
unprofitable may receive financing. This refinancing will occur, and possibly continue, if sunk costs 
have already been incurred. The paper also shows that credit decentralisation offers a way for providers 
of finance (supporting organisations) to credibly commit not to refinance such projects, discouraging 
entrepreneurs from adopting poor projects. 
2 Other researchers have not looked at SBCs as dynamic commitment problems. Boycko, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1996) attempt to explain the SBC phenomenon as being due to political interventions in firms. 
In this case, politicians may have political motivation “to obtain subsidies for firms in financial 
difficulty. They strive to save jobs so as to increase their popularity and political influence”. Bai and 
Wang (1996) consider the SBC as a principal agent problem, with the planner being the agent and the 
government being the principal. Their model is set in an economy with many projects, with some 
projects being ex ante profitable, others ex ante unprofitable but ex post profitable, and others 
unprofitable both ex ante and ex post. The agent first screens for the profitability of the projects, which 
requires effort, deciding afterwards which projects to undertake. The principal cannot terminate ex post 
profitable projects once they have been selected by the agent, even though they are ex ante inefficient. 
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low, but will stop exerting the effort required to keep costs low resulting in cost 
overruns. Dalen, Moen and Riis (2006) suggest that the government can have a 
contract renewal policy where after each period a certain proportion of firms are 
replaced according to where the firms lie in a quality (of project) ranking that is done 
by a third party. The greater the proportion of firms replaced after each period, the 
greater the incentives on the contractors to improve quality. However, there is a trade 
off, replacing firms is costly as new firms will have to incur a sunk cost (which 
implies that the government has to increase the payment made to firms, thus reducing 
the benefits that the government enjoys). 
 
In addition to reputational concerns, a growing literature in economics, psychology 
and sociology has argued that placing individuals that are intrinsically motivated (or 
public service motivated) in the public sector will improve performance in the public 
sector, resulting in greater efficiency in the public sector. Grout and Yong (2003) and 
Grout and Schnedler (2006) have argued that organisational form is important in 
allowing individuals to donate labour. These papers have argued that because the 
public sector can credibly commit to not expropriate labour, individuals are more 
willing to donate labour in the public sector. Francois (2001) argues that agents who 
care about the output will have less incentive to shirk in the public sector than in the 
private sector. This is because public sector managers cannot commit to increase other 
factors of production to maintain output if an agent shirks effort, whereas private 
sector managers can, due to the profit motive. It is argued that the public sector 
provides greater opportunity for public service motivated individuals to carry out 
work that will satisfy these motivations.3 
 
However, these previous approaches to explain cost overruns and low quality, and the 
role of reputation and intrinsic motivation in improving performance leave some room 
for improvement. First, these theories on procurement and reputation do not look at 
how reputational concerns by the principal may affect the agent. This is a very 
important issue as governments that give out procurement contracts have reputational 
concerns as they desire to be re-elected by voters. The desire for re-election, I argue 
can have a profound impact on the incentives of contracted parties.  
                                                 
3 In a recent paper, Gregg, Grout, Ratcliffe, Smith and Windmeijer (2008) show that workers in the 
non-profit sector donate significantly more labour than workers in the private sectors. 
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Second, whilst the literature on intrinsic motivation highlights the benefits of intrinsic 
motivation (public service motivation) in the public sector. The literature on intrinsic 
motivation does not identify what determines whether public service motivated 
individuals join the public sector. There is a growing literature that looks at crowding 
out of pro-social behaviour by extrinsic rewards.4 However there is no work that 
looks at factors that deter intrinsically motivated individuals from joining the public 
sector. Third, the studies on intrinsic motivation do not take into account what 
happens to intrinsic motivation over time.      
 
In order to fill these gaps in the literature, this thesis attempts to provide both 
theoretical explanations and empirical evidence that will show the positive and 
negative effects of reputational concerns and intrinsic motivation in the public sector. 
This thesis will attempt to determine whether extrinsic rewards deter intrinsically 
motivated people from joining the public sector. Second, this thesis will attempt to 
determine what happens to the level of intrinsic motivation of individuals over time. 
Third, this thesis investigates whether reputational concerns by a principal 
(government) can lead to underinvestment of effort by contracted firms. This can also 
be viewed as investigating whether reputational concerns by a manager can lead to 
underinvestment of effort by a subordinate.   
 
This thesis makes several key assumptions. Firstly, I assume that satisfaction with the 
work itself is a proxy for satisfaction derived by individuals from the intrinsic aspects 
of work. Secondly, I assume that contracts are incomplete. This is because the quality 
of services provided in procurement contracts cannot be fully specified in a contract. 
 
In summary, this thesis involves three main objectives: 
1. The first is to theoretically and empirically determine whether extrinsic 
rewards will deter individuals that are intrinsically motivated from joining the 
public sector.  
2. Secondly, the thesis will empirically determine whether intrinsic 
motivation in the public sector adapts over time.    
                                                 
4 See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey of this literature. 
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3. Finally, this thesis will theoretically show that when a principal has 
reputational concerns, under some conditions this can result in an agent under-
investing in firm specific investments that can bring about quality 
improvements or cost reductions.  
 
I.2 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis deals with three themes. The first is to develop a theoretical model and 
undertake empirical analysis to determine whether extrinsic rewards deter intrinsically 
motivated individuals from joining the public sector. The second is to empirically 
determine whether intrinsic motivation (public service motivation) adapts, i.e. to 
examine how intrinsic motivation changes over time in the public sector. The third is 
to develop a theoretical model explaining how reputational concerns by a principal 
can lead to under performance by a contracted agent.  
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter surveys relevant literature that will give 
background information and clarify the research areas where this thesis contributes. 
This survey investigates the literature on the following issues: the relationship 
between intrinsic motivation and public sector performance, and incentive problems 
that occur in public sector contracting and procurement, and a brief overview of how 
to overcome some of these problems. This survey is followed by a brief description of 
the research methodologies that are used in this thesis.  
 
In Chapter 1, I argue that having higher wages and other higher extrinsic rewards, 
such as pay, job security, and working hours, in the public sector (than in the private 
sector) will make it less likely that intrinsically motivated individuals will join the 
public sector. This is because if intrinsically motivated individuals are concerned 
about their reputations for being altruistic, when they join the public sector they gain 
increased utility from undertaking pro-social work in the public sector, but also have 
their utility decreased because the higher extrinsic rewards in the public sector reduce 
their reputations or being altruistic. I then test out this hypothesis using data from the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Using subjective well-being measures I 
show that individuals are less likely to move to the public sector due to the higher 
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amount of extrinsic rewards in the public sector, but are more likely to move to the 
public sector due to the nature of work undertaken in the public sector.  
 
In Chapter 2, I investigate the inter-temporal nature of intrinsic motivation in the 
public sector. That is, I investigate whether public service motivation adapts over 
time. I do this by examining overall job satisfaction and its domains before, during 
and after a change of job and/or employment sector. To gain comparative perspective, 
the job changes I consider are changes from the private sector to the public sector, 
from the public sector to the private sector, job changes within the public sector and 
job changes within the private sector. The analysis is undertaken using data from the 
BHPS. I show that for both men and women, transition into the public sector from the 
private sector results in a permanent increase in overall job satisfaction and 
satisfaction with the intrinsic characteristics of work. All other job changes are 
associated with an increase in job satisfaction and its domains, however these 
increases are not permanent and satisfaction decreases over time. The exception is 
men who make the transition into the private sector. This transition results in a 
permanent increase in job satisfaction, however this increase is associated with 
increased satisfaction from extrinsic rewards, such as pay and job security. Thus, 
overall these results provide strong evidence that intrinsic motivation (public service 
motivation) does not adapt in the public sector.    
 
In Chapter 3, I develop a model to show that when a decision maker (e.g. 
government) has got reputational concerns and can step in to undertake a project 
being undertaken by an agent (e.g. contracted firm) to enhance their reputation for 
being competent, there are cases where the agent will under-invest in effort that could 
result in improved quality of the project. First, I set up the basic structure of the 
model, into which the reputational concerns of the decision maker and the firm 
specific investment made by the agent are included. Then I continue by showing that 
a decision maker with reputational concerns will step in more frequently than is 
optimal. This increases the likelihood of private firms facing expropriation. Therefore, 
private firms choose lower than optimal levels of firm specific quality improving 
investment.   
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Finally, in Chapter 4, I summarise the findings of the theoretical and empirical 
analysis of the thesis. I then provide some concluding remarks based on the findings.      
 
I.3 Literature Survey 1: Intrinsic Motivation and Public Sector Performance5 
 
Early work on intrinsic motivation was undertaken by psychologists. However, more 
recently intrinsic motivation has come to the forefront of economic research. The 
focus of much of the work on intrinsic motivation has been on how it is crowded out 
by extrinsic rewards. Indeed, intrinsic motivation is often identified where output or 
effort decreases when extrinsic rewards are introduced. Intrinsic motivation is 
introduced to the literature in the seminal work of economist Titmuss (1970); and 
psychologists Deci (1971) and Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973). Titmuss (1970), in 
his book The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, argued that 
paying for blood would decrease the supply of donated blood because monetary 
compensation would undermine social values. Deci (1971) found that when money 
was used as an external reward there was a decrease in intrinsic motivation. The paper 
also finds that verbal reinforcement and positive feedback increased intrinsic 
motivation. Lepper et al. (1973) found that amongst children, extrinsic rewards 
reduced intrinsic motivation.   
  
Continuing on the work by Deci (1971) and Lepper et al. (1973), researchers in 
psychology have built up empirical evidence showing that providing monetary 
rewards for some tasks can have negative consequences.6 Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 
(1999) provide a survey of empirical results that show that extrinsic rewards have a 
negative effect on intrinsic motivation. 
 
Modelling using agents with altruistic and other regarding preferences has become 
increasingly common in economics. This has been very important because it has 
allowed economists to better understand many social and economic interactions, 
especially interactions where individuals display pro-social behaviour. This section 
argues that other regarding preferences and other pro-social motivations have 
                                                 
5 This literature survey includes literature that will be discussed once more in Chapters 1 and 2. 
6 See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey on motivation crowding theory of literature from both 
economics and psychology.  
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significant economic impacts in the provision of public goods and social services. The 
section then moves on to discuss pro-social motivation in the public sector, i.e. public 
service motivation. The section continues by discussing how monetary and other 
extrinsic rewards may crowd out altruism and other pro-social behaviours and then 
finally discusses the literature on adaptation.  
 
I.3.1 Pro-social Motivation and Performance  
 
Economists divide altruism and pro-social behaviours into two types, impure (or 
action-oriented) altruism and pure (output-oriented) altruism. Impure or action-
oriented altruism is where agents derive a direct benefit from performing tasks that 
the agent considers worthwhile. The agent may care about the impact of his actions, 
but this type of modelling emphasises that the agent derives utility from undertaking a 
worthwhile task. Pure or output-orientated altruism is where an agent derives a direct 
benefit from the worthwhile good or service itself. These definitions highlight two 
important differences in the two types of altruism. Firstly, free-riding only occurs 
when there is pure altruism. With impure altruism, agents derive direct benefit from 
undertaking the worthwhile task and thus free-riding is not a problem. With pure 
altruism, agents derive benefit from the worthwhile good or service, regardless of 
who was responsible for its provision. Secondly, pure altruism also gives rise to a 
moral hazard problem. This is because agents maybe unsure about how much of their 
effort is contributing to the provision of the worthwhile good. There is no moral 
hazard problem with impure altruism (Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2007).  
 
I begin by considering the literature on impure altruism. Andreoni (1990) argues that 
individuals not only gain from increasing the total supply of public goods, but they 
also gain additional utility from giving, i.e. there is a “warm glow” that people receive 
from giving. Empirical evidence of the “warm glow” effect is given by Meier and 
Stutzer (2006), who find that volunteers have higher life satisfaction than non-
volunteers. 
 
Besley and Ghatak (2005) investigate the effect of having impure altruism on the 
optimum contract in a setting with moral hazard. They do this by studying the optimal 
incentive where some agents are pro-socially motivated and others are motivated by 
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monetary and other extrinsic rewards. They show that better matching of agents and 
principals with similar preferences reduces the need for high-powered incentives and 
increases organizational efficiency. Altruistic agents are shown to provide more effort 
and to require less monetary compensation than extrinsically motivated agents.  
 
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) investigate firm selection and screening of workers whose 
type varies between workers that are impurely altruistic and workers that are 
extrinsically motivated. They show that the employer faces a trade off in designing 
his or her optimal wage scheme in that by increasing wages, the employer increases 
the probability of hiring workers that have low levels of pro-social motivation. 
Francois (2007) finds a similar result. He finds that higher wages increase the number 
of applications from both shirkers and non-shirkers. He also finds that the impact on 
output depends on the relative density of the two types of workers, i.e. if there is a 
higher concentration of shirkers, then having higher wages will reduce output.  
 
Dixit (2005) constructs a model where a firm produces two types of output, primary 
output and its by product, both of which are intrinsically valuable to the worker. The 
principal, however, only values the primary output and only compensates the worker 
for provision of the primary output. The paper shows that the agent’s pro-social 
motivation is a substitute for monetary compensation, but lowering compensation also 
lowers the output of the by-product, if the principal has an aversion for the by-
product. Canton (2005) finds that pro-social motivation reduces the fixed cost of 
meeting the worker’s participation constraint and also finds that intrinsically 
motivated workers only need small amounts of incentives to induce effort. Murdock 
(2002) shows that pro-social motivation induces firms to invest in projects with 
higher intrinsic payoffs. Pro-social firms are more likely to invest in projects that have 
ex ante negative returns but can generate positive returns if the project is intrinsically 
valuable to the worker and the worker provides higher effort, increasing the likelihood 
of positive profits for the firm.  
 
All the above literature concludes that impure altruism reduces the need for high 
powered incentives to induce effort. This suggests that if pro-social motivation is 
correctly harnessed, it can result in the delivery of services and goods that pro-
socially motivated individuals find worthwhile at a lower cost.  
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I now turn to pure or output oriented altruism. Francois (2000) argues that agents who 
care about the output will have less incentive to shirk in the public sector than in the 
private sector. This is because public sector managers cannot commit to increase other 
factors of production to maintain output if an agent shirks effort, whereas private 
sector managers can, due to the profit motive. Therefore agents that care output will 
exert more effort in the public sector than in the private sector because in the public 
sector their extra effort goes to producing more of the output. Whereas in the private 
sector the agents anticipate that if they do not exert extra effort the manager will 
increase other factors of production to ensure output levels are maintained because of 
the profit motive.  
 
This suggests that in the private sector, if employers can somehow commit to not be 
able to increase the other factors of production if employees (who care about the 
output) shirk, then purely altruistic employees would exert more effort. Francois 
(2001) investigates this. This paper argues that if firms can gain a reputation for not 
expropriating the extra effort of employees by reducing other the factors of 
production, then employees would exert extra effort. However, this does not 
overcome the free riding problem associated with output-orientated altruism. 
Employees still derive utility from the output if other employees exert extra effort, 
thus resulting in under provision of effort. To overcome this problem, Francois (2007) 
argues that firms should use performance-contingent compensation. Assuming that 
employees are heterogeneous in their valuation of the output, this is because without 
performance-contingent compensation employees with high valuations for the output 
will exert extra effort, whilst individuals with low valuations do not exert any effort. 
This negatively affects output.  
 
Several other papers are also concerned with firm commitment as a mechanism to 
induce extra effort (in the form of donated labour) and monetary donations. Grout and 
Yong (2003) and Grout and Schnedler (2006) also argue that individuals are more 
willing to donate labour in the not for profit sector because the public sector can 
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credibly commit not to expropriate labour.7 Bilodeau and Slivinski (1998) argue that 
by choosing non-profit status, instead of for-profit, firms can commit not to 
appropriate funds thus inducing higher monetary donations from society. Glazer 
(2004) shows that if a firm can commit to provide a level of capital (even after 
observing the employee’s effort); this induces purely altruistic employees to exert 
extra effort. Rowat and Seabright (2006) argue that aid agency hiring of purely 
altruistic workers is a commitment device that shows donors that its managers are 
willing to work for less money in order to undertake provision of the worthwhile 
action. Delfgaauw (2007) argues that doctors who are both purely altruistic and value 
extrinsic rewards prefer to work in the public sector whereas doctors that only value 
extrinsic rewards prefer to work in the private sector. This is because in the public 
sector, the altruistic doctors can treat patients that cannot afford the extra effort 
required to ensure quality treatment.8 Vlassopoulos (2006) argues that committing not 
to appropriate donated labour and being mission-orientated allows non-profit 
employers to attract purely altruistic volunteers with career aspirations.  
 
Researchers have also investigated gender differences in pro-social behaviour. 
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that women are more altruistic when it is more 
costly to be altruistic and that men are more altruistic when it is less costly. Cronson 
and Gneezy (2009) find that the social preferences of women are more situationally 
specific and more malleable than men.9 This finding that women are more sensitive to 
social cues in determining appropriate behaviour implies that women may place 
higher value on a pro-social reputational than men. Benabou and Tirole (2006, 
pp.1662) argue if indeed women have higher weights on pro-social reputational 
concerns than men, then women are more likely to contribute more pro-social actions 
in the absence of extrinsic rewards and women will also more likely respond more 
negatively than men to extrinsic rewards. Evidence of this is found by Mellstrom and 
Johannesson (2008) who when studying the willingness to donate blood find that in 
the absence of monetary incentives women donate more blood than men. However, 
                                                 
7 Grout and Schnedler (2006) introduce a third player, an output-orientated individual willing to 
contribute effort. They show that labour contribution of the individual is dependent on the negotiating 
power of the individual. With less negotiating power the individual contributes more labour.  
8 Delfgaauw (2007) also shows that in mixed strategy equilibrium, having both private and public 
sector doctors is pareto superior to having only private sector provision or only public sector provision 
of medical care.  
9 Cronson and Gneezy (2009) give a survey on gender differences in preferences.   
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when monetary incentives are introduced, the blood donations of women drop 
significantly. When subjects are offered the choice to give the monetary payment to 
charity, the blood donations of women increase back to levels when there were no 
monetary incentives. The blood donations of men remain approximately the same 
throughout. Thus, in this thesis I also investigate gender differences.  
 
I.3.2 Public Service Motivation 
 
Pro-social behaviour in the public sector is referred to as Public Service Motivation 
(PSM). The concept of PSM originated in the discipline of public administration. 
Perry (1996) defines PSM as “an individual's predisposition to respond to motives 
grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions”. This predisposition is a 
combination of both impure and pure altruism. It is determined by environmental 
factors, such as parental modelling or socialization within organizations. It reflects 
three categories of motives: rational, norm-based and affective. Rational motives are 
present when individuals want to participate in policy-making to pursue their political 
agenda, or when individuals commit to a public program because they personally 
identify with it. Norm-based motives are generated by a desire to pursue the public 
interest; they include patriotism, civic duty and a sense of loyalty to the government. 
Affective motives refer to behaviour motivated by emotional responses to different 
social contexts and are characterized by a desire to help others. 
 
Most of the empirical evidence on the existence and impact of PSM is found in the 
public administration literature. Brewer and Selden (1998) find evidence of PSM 
amongst whistle-blowers in the public sector. However, because their sample only 
consists of workers in the public sector, this paper is not able to give a comparative 
perspective of PSM. That is, we cannot tell whether whistle-blowers behave any 
differently in the private sector from this paper. Crewson (1997) and Dilulio (1994) 
show that workers in the public sector report higher satisfaction with the intrinsic 
characteristics of work than workers in the private sector. Houston (2000) shows that 
public sector employees are more likely to place a higher value on the intrinsic 
rewards. Houston (2006) shows that public sector workers undertake more charitable 
activities than workers in the private sector.  
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In economics, recent literature has attempted to estimate the impact of having 
intrinsically motivated individuals in the public sector. A recent paper by Gregg, 
Grout, Ratcliffe, Smith and Windmeijer (2008) shows that workers in the non-profit 
sector donate significantly more labour than workers in the private sectors. They find 
that workers in the non-profit sector are 12 percentage points more likely to undertake 
unpaid overtime. This amounts to an equivalent of an extra 60,000 people working in 
the non-profit sector in the UK. Thus having intrinsically motivated individuals in the 
public sector can have a dramatic impact on public sector performance. Since 
intrinsically motivated workers can be of great benefit to the public sector, this thesis 
will attempt to determine whether intrinsically motivated workers are attracted to the 
public sector and attempt to identify the factors that stop intrinsically motivated 
workers from joining the public sector. Thus this thesis will determine whether it is 
the public sector that causes individuals to have higher intrinsic motivation or whether 
it is individuals with higher intrinsic motivation that are attracted to the public sector. 
This thesis will also attempt to determine whether intrinsically motivated workers 
remain intrinsically motivated as their length of time of employment in the public 
sector increases.   
 
I.3.3 Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation 
 
Motivation crowding out proposes that the introduction of monetary incentives or 
punishments may undermine intrinsic motivation. According to Francois and 
Vlassopoulos (2007) intrinsic motivation is “where an individual pursues actions not 
because of external rewards but because the activity is valuable in its own right”.10 
Motivation crowding theory has its roots in both economics and psychology. In 
economics, Titmuss (1970), in his book The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to 
Social Policy, argued that paying for blood would decrease the supply donated blood 
because monetary compensation would undermine social values.  
 
                                                 
10 Frey (1997) cites the definition of intrinsic motivation by Deci (1971), “one is said to be intrinsically 
motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself.” 
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In psychology, researchers have built up empirical evidence showing that providing 
monetary rewards for some tasks can have negative consequences.11 Deci, Koestner, 
and Ryan (1999) provide a survey of empirical results that show that extrinsic rewards 
have a negative effect on intrinsic motivation. They also find that extrinsic rewards do 
not negatively affect intrinsic motivation when they are unexpected or when they are 
not related to the performance of a task. This leads them to conclude that extrinsic 
rewards undermine self-regulation, i.e. a consequence of extrinsic rewards is that 
individuals take less responsibility for self motivation.   
 
Motivation crowding out has now come to the forefront of economics. Benabou and 
Tirole (2006) develop a theory that considers both an individual’s altruistic 
motivation for undertaking pro-social behaviour and an individual’s care for monetary 
transfers, i.e. greed. Given an individual is concerned about how others perceive 
him/her, rewards (monetary transfers) provide some incentives for undertaking pro-
social behaviour, however they reduce the reputation (and thus create doubt) for 
altruism and thus reduce the utility the individual derives from pro-social behaviour. 
Visibility is shown to encourage pro-social behaviour to a limit. When actions are too 
visible, this results in less intrinsically motivated agents making it more difficult to 
signal one’s altruism. 
 
Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996) and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) 
show that people are less likely to accept that “Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) 
projects are undertaken in their own town when they are offered monetary 
compensation. In an experimental study, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) show that 
individuals exert less effort when a small amount of monetary compensation is 
offered than when no compensation is offered. In Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) the 
introduction of a fine to parents who are late in collecting their children from school 
increases the rate of parents arriving late. Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) show that 
image motivation is crowded out by monetary incentives, meaning that monetary 
incentives are less likely to work in public pro-social activities and more likely to 
work in private pro-social activities. Carpenter and Myers (2007) find that altruism 
and reputational concerns are positively related to individual's volunteering to be fire 
                                                 
11 See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey on motivation crowding theory of literature from both 
economics and psychology.  
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fighters. They also find that positive effect that monetary incentives have on 
volunteering decline with reputational concerns, thus providing further evidence of 
extrinsic incentives crowding out pro-social behaviour. Mellstrom and Johannesson 
(2008) study the willingness to donate blood find that in the absence of monetary 
incentives women donate more blood than men. However, when monetary incentives 
are introduced, the blood donations of women drop significantly. When subjects are 
offered the choice to give the monetary payment to charity, the blood donations of 
women increase back to levels when there were no monetary incentives. The blood 
donations of men remain approximately the same throughout. 
 
I.3.4 Adaptation 
 
The concept of adaptation was first noted in the late 19th century by economists and 
has more recently come to the attention of economists again (see Bruni and Sugden 
(2007)). Work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) gives some theoretical background 
to adaptation, though a complete theoretical model for adaptation is still to be 
developed.  
 
Adaptation (or habituation) is where events cause an individual’s subjective well-
being to depart from a baseline. Gradually the positive or negative effect of such 
events cease having an impact and subjective well-being (SWB) returns towards the 
baseline level (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978)). The baseline level of 
SWB of an individual is mostly due to personality traits and past experience. Heady 
and Wearing (1989) propose that after an unexpected event, individuals will adapt 
back to a baseline level of SWB because individuals have stable personality traits 
which individuals revert to after initially experiencing a change in SWB.  
 
There are several reasons why adaptation may take place when one moves to a new 
job. Firstly there are various aspects of a new job that may de-motivate an employee 
and overtime these de-motivating job factors reduce the satisfaction derived from the 
job. Secondly, promotion prospects have a positive impact on job satisfaction (Clark 
(2004)). However, when one is promoted the new responsibilities and roles of the new 
position may reduce satisfaction derived from the type of work one undertook before.  
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Although most of the empirical literature that has looked at modelling subjective well 
being data and adaptation has considered contemporaneous correlations, there is a 
growing literature that has begun to use large-scale panel data. The use of large-scale 
panel data allows one to analyse changes in subjective well-being of a particular 
individual around the time of a particular event, this is the approach I take in this 
thesis. 
 
There is a growing literature that uses panel data to analyse adaptation. An early study 
is by Headey and Wearing (1989) that uses data from the Australian Panel Study to 
show that individuals’ subjective well being is affected by both good and bad events. 
However in this study used a large variety of events, some of which arguably would 
not have much impact on subjective well being. Secondly, even though this study had 
data covering 8 years, this data was from only 3 waves. Panel data over 3 waves may 
not be enough to make conclusions about the existence of adaptation.  
 
Most of the literature on adaptation has focused on adaptation to income and 
unemployment. This literature has found that unemployment reduces subjective well-
being. Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2001) show that life satisfaction is 
negatively correlated with inflation and unemployment for 12 European countries and 
the United States using data from the Euro-Barometer Survey and United States 
General Social Survey. Clark and Oswald (1994) use data from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) to show that unemployment lowers subjective well being. They 
show that this lowering of subjective well being declines the longer one stays 
unemployed. Using 3 data sets, the BHPS, European Community Household Panel 
(ECPS), and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), Clark (2006) finds 
evidence of unemployment having less impact on life satisfaction over time. 
Blanchflower (2001) finds that unemployment lowers subjective well being in East 
European countries and in countries that were former members a unified Soviet 
Union. Bjorklund and Eriksson (1998) also find a negative relationship between 
subjective well being and unemployment in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.  
 
Other authors have investigated how individuals respond to other life events. This 
literature has focused on how individuals respond to marriage and divorce. Stutzer 
and Frey (2006) and Lucas, Clark, Diener, and Georgellis (2003) show that 
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individuals fully adapt to marriage after being married for a few years.  Lucas, Clark, 
Diener, and Georgellis (2004) show that individuals do not adapt fully back to 
baseline levels due to unemployment. Clark, Diener, Georgellis, and Lucas (2008) use 
data from German households to analyse how individuals adapt and anticipate six 
different life events: unemployment, marriage, divorce, widowhood, birth of child, 
and layoff. They find that individuals do not fully adapt to unemployment. However, 
they cannot reject the hypothesis of full adaptation to marriage, divorce, widowhood, 
being laid off, and the birth of a child.  
 
Chi, Freeman, and Kleiner (2006) take a similar approach to Chapter 2 in 
investigating how individuals’ subjective well being responds to changing jobs. Using 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), they find that workers 
who leave to their jobs voluntarily, seeking another job have higher long term job 
satisfaction. Surprisingly they also find that public sector workers report lower job 
satisfaction after controlling for various individual and job characteristics. This last 
result maybe because their sample is of young workers, whose preferences and 
sources of satisfaction from work may differ from older workers.  
 
I.3.5 Contribution to this literature. 
 
In this thesis I argue that intrinsic motivation in the public sector, i.e. public service 
motivation, leads to improved performance by the public sector both in terms of cost 
and quality. This is because employees that are public service motivated do not need 
high powered incentives (as compared to extrinsically motivated employees) to 
produce the worthwhile good or service. This means the public sector can provide a 
service at a lower price with workers that are public service motivated as compared to 
using workers that are extrinsically motivated. In addition, workers with PSM care 
about the output and therefore will not shirk on effort that is required to produce 
output that is of high quality.  
 
In this thesis I attempt to find evidence of PSM and investigate whether extrinsic 
rewards crowd out PSM. The literature survey shows that the empirical evidence on 
PSM is not conclusive for the following two reasons. The leading studies in the 
literature do not compare intrinsic motivation in the public sector to that in other 
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sectors (for example Brewer and Selden, 1998). Conclusions about the existence of 
PSM can only be made after investigating how individuals with PSM behave in the 
private sector and other sectors. Secondly, the studies in the literature do not show 
whether it is the public sector that causes individuals to derive greater satisfaction 
from the intrinsic characteristics of their work or whether it is individuals who derive 
greater satisfaction from the intrinsic characteristics of public-sector work that are 
attracted to the public sector.  
 
I use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to investigate whether 
PSM can explain individuals' propensity to move into public sector jobs. Using this 
approach, I can show that that PSM is what attracts individuals to the public sector, 
thus providing evidence for the existence of PSM. I also investigate whether higher 
extrinsic rewards in the public sector (compared to the private sector) deter 
individuals with PSM from joining the public sector because higher extrinsic rewards 
lower the reputational gain for such individuals joining the public sector (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2006).     
 
In this thesis, I also investigate whether the public service motivation of individuals 
adapts. That is, I investigate whether the positive effect of a public service motivated 
individual joining the public sector dissipates over time? The public sector allows 
individuals with PSM to be better able to carry out their pro-social motivations, 
however if their motivation decreases over time back to a baseline level, i.e. adapts, 
then the benefits of having individuals with high levels of PSM in the public sector 
may be over estimated.  
 
I.4 Literature Survey 2: Public Sector Procurement and Contracting12 
 
The non-contractible nature of every aspect in a project, such as quality, is the source 
of low quality and cost overruns in procurement. Thus this section begins by 
discussing the literature on procurement in an incomplete contracting framework. The 
section then moves on to discuss how regulatory risk impacts economic interactions. 
                                                 
12 This literature survey includes literature that will be discussed once more in Chapter 3. 
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Finally, the section investigates the benefits and costs of reputational concerns in 
contracting.    
  
I.4.1 Contracting and Procurement 
 
I begin with a review of literature that uses the incomplete contracting framework to 
analyse quality concerns in public procurement. This is because quality is difficult to 
fully specify in a contract. As a result, most of the literature in this survey also 
assumes contract incompleteness. If everything was observable and could be specified 
in a contract, then the contract could ensure that the first best allocation is achieved 
regardless of whether there is in-house provision or contracting out. In such a case, 
the principal would be indifferent between contracting out and in house 
provision. However, in practice, quality is often not observable. Therefore, in order to 
fully understand the benefits and costs of in house provision versus contracting out, 
we have to consider a situation where contracts are incomplete and residual control 
rights are important in motivating agents.   
 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) look at whether it is optimal for a government to 
provide public services internally or to contract out their provision. The paper 
considers a model with two types of costly innovations, one that leads to lower costs 
(but adversely affects quality) and one that leads to improved quality. They assume 
incomplete contracts. Property rights can be allocated to the government (in house 
provision) or can be allocated to the private sector (contracting out). The private 
provider has a larger incentive to invest in cost reducing innovations (that lead to 
lower quality). Government provision by an employee has got less incentive to lower 
costs. Their model finds that in house provision is better when non contractible cost 
reductions have a large adverse impact on quality, or if quality reduction cannot be 
controlled contractually, and when quality innovations are not important. Private 
provision is better when cost reductions are accompanied little quality reduction (or 
quality reduction can be controlled contractually), and when quality innovations are 
strong. 
 
Schmidt (1996) uses the incomplete contracts approach to explain why privatization 
may be more beneficial than public provision. The paper shows that different 
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government structures that are a result of different allocations of property rights 
between the private firm and the government “give rise to different commitment 
options for the government and different incentives for the management to save costs, 
which can explain some of the costs and benefits of privatization endogenously”. The 
paper argues that a manager in a privatized firm will have greater incentives to 
minimize costs and produce more (or face bankruptcy thus facing a “hard budget 
constraint”) than one in a public entity (productive efficiency). However, due to cost 
cutting, allocative efficiency is lower under privatization than government. Therefore 
there is a trade off between lower allocative efficiency and greater productive 
efficiency that comes with privatization. 
 
Besley and Ghatak (2001) consider how the allocation of property rights between a 
public entity and private firms (NGOs) will affect the provision of public goods. The 
main result of the paper is that it shows that when contracts are incomplete, it is better 
to allocate the ownership of the public good/service to the party that values the project 
the most (relatively more). This is true regardless of whether this party is also a key 
investor, or is at an advantage in other key aspects of the required technology. 
 
Expected future earnings and contract renewal have been proposed as a means of 
improving quality in procurement projects. Klein and Leffler (1981) were the first to 
propose the repeat purchase mechanism as a mechanism that provides firms with an 
incentive to maintain quality. They argue that the value of future profits motivate 
firms to maintain quality. Laffont and Tirole (1993) show that for experience goods 
(goods whose quality reveals itself upon purchase), the optimal contract for public 
procurement of these goods lowers the incentive to reduce costs in order to increase 
incentives to achieve higher quality. The contractors have an incentive to improve 
quality because this increases the probability that they can provide the service for the 
government again. Dalen, Moen, and Riis (2006) argue that contract renewal creates 
incentives for contracted parties to improve quality. They propose that having the 
private firms in a tournament where the quality of projects is ordinally ranked. They 
show that not renewing the contracts of firms whose project quality ranking is in the 
bottom 50% of ranking is the optimal renewal policy that trades off improved quality 
at the expense of entry costs of new firms. 
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Cost overruns are also the result of poor contract design. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) 
consider the decision to provide a service/good within the firm or to have it provided 
by an external company. In the model developed, the buyer incurs a cost for the 
design (this cost is ex ante). The better the design (higher design cost for buyer), the 
lower the ex post renegotiation cost. That is, the more complete a contract, the higher 
the design cost, the lower the probability of renegotiation ex post. In addition, ex post 
renegotiation occurs under asymmetric information with the seller (contractor) having 
private information about the costs involved. This makes fixed price contracts costly 
to renegotiate. This paper shows that projects that are simple will be procured using 
fixed price contracts as their designs have a high degree of completeness and so are 
unlikely to require renegotiation. Projects with complex designs, and therefore have a 
high degree of incompleteness and require alteration and so costly renegotiation. Such 
projects are better provided using cost plus contracts. Projects that are needed to be 
completed in a short period of time are best provided using cost plus contracts due to 
low levels of design completeness. The basic trade off the Tadelis and Bajari model is 
that with a fixed price contract, a firm has incentives to produce effort that will reduce 
costs. However, if any contingencies arise, renegotiation is very expensive because in 
addition to the modification costs, the sponsor has to pay an additional amount to the 
contractor because the contractor has no incentive to change from the original 
contract (and has asymmetric information about the additional costs). With cost plus 
pricing, the private firm faces no incentives that will induce it produce effort to reduce 
costs and so costs will be higher in this case.  
 
Cost overruns are also attributed to a lack of competition when bidding for 
procurement contracts. Ganuza (2000) proposes that the sponsor of a project will alter 
the degree of design specification depending on the level of competition amongst the 
contractors that will bid for the contract. If there is a high level of competition 
amongst the contractors, the paper proposes that the sponsor will have a high degree 
of design specification. This in turn results in a lower chance of there being cost 
overruns when the project is being implemented. In contrast, if there is a low level of 
competition amongst the contractors, the sponsor will have a low degree of design 
specification. This results in a higher likelihood of there being cost overruns during 
the implementation of the project. 
 
 30 
 
I.4.2 Regulatory Risk  
 
Researchers have not fully analysed the impact that regulatory risk can have on the 
incentives of private firms involved in procurement contracts to reduce costs and 
improve quality. Regulatory risk is the risk associated with the likelihood that laws 
and regulations related to a particular industry, country, or type of security, will 
change and thus affect the projects and investments in those industries, countries, or 
their funding arrangements.  
 
Research has found that uncertainty over possible future regulatory intervention can 
have adverse effects; for example possible regulatory taking of land negatively affects 
land value (Riddiogough, 1995), regulatory restructuring can adversely affect delivery 
of electricity  (Ishii and Yan, 2004), regulatory risk increases share volatility 
(Robinson and Taylor, 1998), and regulatory risk increases systematic risk (Buckland 
and Fraser, 2001). Recently Panteghini and Scarpa (2008) have attempted to give a 
theoretical explanation to regulatory risk in price-capped industries whereby they 
argue that price-cap rules suffer from a credibility problem. They argue that 
regulatory risk comes about when regulated firms make large profits.  
 
In this thesis, I argue that reputational concerns are also an important source of 
regulatory risk. I show that reputational concerns increase regulatory risk by 
increasing the level of government intervention above the optimal level of 
intervention. In addition, the research on regulatory risk does not consider the impact 
of regulatory risk on the incentives faced by other parties in contractual relationships. 
Therefore in this thesis, I investigate the impact of possible government intervention 
on the level of quality firm specific investments by private firms contracted by the 
government.  
 
I.4.3 Reputational Concerns 
  
Reputational concerns are argued to enhance commitment power, therefore inducing 
higher effort levels in quality provision (or cost reduction). Thus, reputational 
concerns act as implicit contracts. Holmstrom (1999) studies how a person’s concern 
for a future career may influence the individual’s incentives to exert effort or make 
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decisions in the individual’s current job. The individual’s productive performance is 
revealed over time in the model. The individual’s wage in each period is based on 
expected output, and expected output in turn depends on assessed output, thus linking 
today’s performance with tomorrow’s income. There is an incentive problem because 
an individual can take unobserved actions to affect the current period’s performance 
thus affecting future income. Since the paper assumes an individual will choose 
between actions that benefit the individual and actions that benefit the firm, career 
concerns are shown to have detrimental and beneficial effects depending on how well 
the two actions are aligned. Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa (1986) also show how 
career concerns influence managers in capital rationing and investment decisions.   
 
Further studies have investigated the impact of reputational concerns on other aspects 
of behaviour. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2000) show 
how career concerns lead to herding, i.e. where players ignore their own signals of the 
state of the world and follow the actions of other players. Levy (2004) demonstrates 
how reputational concerns lead to anti-herding, i.e. where players ignore their signals 
of the state of the world (that other players have also received and acted upon) and 
choose actions that are different from other players in order to distinguish themselves. 
 
Recent studies have highlighted the negative effects of reputational concerns. Morris 
(2001) considers a case where there is an advisor and an uninformed decision maker 
with identical preferences, which implies that the advisor has a current incentive to 
truthfully reveal her information. However, the advisor will have a reputational 
incentive to lie if the uninformed decision maker believes that the advisor is biased in 
favour of one decision. No information is conveyed in equilibrium if the advisor's 
reputational concerns are strong enough. In a repeated game, it is shown that the 
advisor (with the same preferences as the decision maker) will distort his revelation 
from the truthful one in the first period because she wants her opinion to be valuable 
in future periods. Morris calls this the “political correctness effect”. 
 
Ely and Valimaki (2003) argue that in some cases when the nature of the task 
undertaken naturally has a high frequency of bad observations, this leads the principal 
to believe that a good agent is bad. In such a case, a good agent will try to build a 
good reputation by reducing the frequency of these bad events, even though it is not 
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optimal to do so. The principal will anticipate this and therefore a good agent 
becomes just as unfavoured as a bad agent to the principal. In both these papers, it is 
shown that in some cases an agent will have a desire to deviate from her preference 
due to the agent having reputational concerns. This differs with my work where it is 
the reputational concerns of the principal that give rise to the agent's under investment 
problem.13 
 
I.4.4 Contribution to this Literature 
 
The survey in this section has shown that procurement contracts suffer from cost 
overruns and low quality. It is argued that regulatory risk can also result in poor 
performance in contractual relationships. It has also been shown that reputational 
concerns can act as implicit contracts that provide incentives to reduce costs and 
improve quality.  
 
This thesis contributes to this literature by developing a theoretical model where the 
reputational concerns of a principal result in underinvestment of quality improving 
effort by a contractor. This is because the model shows that the principal is more 
likely to intervene (step in and takeover provision of the project) when he/she has got 
reputational concerns. This has important social implications especially in cases 
where provision of services should be provided by the public sector or requires more 
stringent regulation by the government.  
 
This theoretical model shows how the reputational concerns of one party can affect 
the incentives faced by other parties in a hierarchy. Thus this paper contributes to a 
better understanding of how reputational concerns have an impact on players in 
different hierarchies of organisations and contractual relationships.    
 
I.5 Methodologies 
 
This section of the thesis describes the methodologies used for theoretical and 
empirical analysis. The thesis will theoretically show how reputational concerns by a 
                                                 
13 Several authors have investigated the adverse effects on public spending of reputational concerns 
(e.g. Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) and Coate and Morris (1995)). 
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principal (the government) can negatively affect a private contractor’s incentives to 
improve the quality of a project. Empirically, the thesis investigates whether 
individuals are attracted to the public sector because they are public sector motivated 
and whether high extrinsic rewards in the public sector may deter individuals that 
have high levels of PSM from joining the public sector. Finally, the thesis empirically 
investigates whether PSM adapts over time.     
 
I.5.1 Theoretical Methodology 
 
The theoretical model used in the thesis is used to analyse how the reputational 
concerns of a principal affect the incentives of a private contractor to improve quality. 
To achieve this objective I construct a dynamic game with three players. The three 
players are an evaluator, the decision maker (government) and the private firm. 
Importantly, the decision maker can step in and take over the provision of the project 
at the end of the first period. The decision to step in is influenced by the desire for the 
decision maker to appear competent to the evaluator. I show in mixed strategy 
equilibrium that reputational concerns cause the decision maker to step in more often 
than is optimal. This in turn results in the private firm producing less than optimal 
firm specific investment that would improve the quality of a project.   
 
I.5.2 Econometric Methodology 
 
For the empirical analysis I use data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). The BHPS began in 1991, with the first wave taking place in late 1991 and 
concluding in early 1992. The BHPS contains a wide range of information on 
households and individuals. The first wave consists of approximately 5,500 
households and 10,300 individuals. In 1999, an additional sample of 1,500 households 
each was added to Scotland and Wales. In 2001, an additional sample of 2,000 
households was added to Northern Ireland. The BHPS is thus a good data source for 
social science research of the United Kingdom (UK). In addition the BHPS follows 
the same individuals over a number of years, allowing us to identify individuals and 
their characteristics as they move between the private and public sectors. 
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To measure utility derived from the job, and the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of 
work we use the response from a series of questions on job satisfaction. Referring to a 
1-7 scale where a value of 1 corresponds to “not satisfied at all” and a value of 7 
corresponds to “completely satisfied”, the interviewees were asked to rank their level 
of satisfaction with respect to overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with total pay 
(including any overtime and bonuses), job security, the actual work itself, and the 
hours they work. I use satisfaction with the work itself as a proxy for utility derived 
from the intrinsic aspects of the job.14 I use satisfaction with pay, job security and 
working hours as proxies for utility derived from extrinsic rewards. I use overall job 
satisfaction as a proxy for overall utility derived from work.   
  
I also control for other individual and job characteristics, such as age, sex and 
education. I consider only workers aged between the ages 18 to 65 and only full time 
workers. I only consider full time workers because the nature of satisfaction 
experienced by full time workers is different to that of part time workers and full time 
workers give us more observations. 
 
The empirical analysis first attempts to find evidence of PSM and investigate whether 
extrinsic rewards deter individuals with PSM from joining the public sector. I 
estimate standard Mincer-type earnings functions corrected for selectivity bias for 
both selection into the private and public sector individually for men and women, and 
for both men and women combined. I then repeat this by estimating satisfaction 
functions for the domains of job satisfaction, i.e. satisfaction with the work itself, pay, 
job security and the working hours. I then use these estimates to generate predicted 
earnings and satisfaction (with the different aspects of work) in the private and public 
sector for each individual. I calculate the expected earnings and satisfaction 
differential between the public and private sector for each individual in our sample, 
irrespective of current status. Finally, these expected earnings and satisfaction 
differentials are then used when estimating the probability of transition into the public 
sector using probit estimation. To gain a comparative perspective, I also estimate the 
probability of transition into the private sector using probit estimation.  
 
                                                 
14 Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2009) also use satisfaction with the work itself as a proxy for utility 
derived from the intrinsic aspects of work.  
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The empirical analyses then moves on to investigate whether PSM adapts. I consider 
job changes from the private to the public sector, but also consider job changes from 
the public to the private sector, and job changes within the public and private sectors 
to gain a comparative perspective. To undertake this analysis, I create lead and lag 
variables. Lead variables are dummy variables that have a value of 1 when the 
individuals will to the change job within a given number of years. For my analysis I 
construct lead variables for each year in the 4 years leading to an individual’s change 
of job. Lag variables are dummy variables that have a value of 1 when in the years 
after an individual has changed jobs. I construct lag variables for each of the first 5 
years after the job change and a long term lag variable that has a value 1 for more 
than 5 years after transition. Finally, job satisfaction and its domains are the 
dependent variables in fixed effects panel estimation, with the lead and lag variables 
as the key explanatory variables.   
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Chapter 1 
Crowding Out Public Service Motivation 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Hiring individuals with Public Service Motivation (PSM) is often proposed as a way 
to improve public sector performance and to overcome incentive problems in the 
public sector. In this chapter I attempt to find evidence of PSM and to investigate 
whether extrinsic rewards crowd out PSM. 
 
The concept of PSM has its roots in the public administration literature where it is 
broadly defined as “an individual's predisposition to respond to motives grounded 
primarily or uniquely in public institutions” (Perry, 1996). This predisposition is 
determined by environmental factors, such as parental modelling or socialization 
within organizations. It reflects three categories of motives: rational, norm-based and 
affective. Rational motives are present when individuals want to participate in policy-
making to pursue their political agenda, or when individuals commit to a public 
program because they personally identify with it. Norm-based motives are generated 
by a desire to pursue the public interest; they include patriotism, civic duty and a 
sense of loyalty to the government. Affective motives refer to behaviour motivated by 
emotional responses to different social contexts and are characterized by a desire to 
help others (Perry, 1996). 
 
The presence of PSM generates a number of implications. If values and sentiments 
associated with the public sector are attractive to individuals with PSM, hiring these 
individuals will help to overcome incentive problems in the public sector. Agents who 
care about the output will have less incentive to shirk in the public sector than in the 
private sector.15 This is because public sector managers cannot commit to increase 
other factors of production to maintain output if an agent shirks effort, whereas 
private sector managers can, due to the profit motive (Francois, 2001).16 Further, 
                                                 
15 See Francois and Vlassopoulos (2007) for a survey of literature that discusses the role of pro-social 
motivation in overcoming incentive problems in the provision of public goods. 
16 Individuals are more willing to donate labour in the public sector because the public sector can 
credibly commit not to expropriate labour (see Grout and Yong; 2003 and Grout and Schnedler; 2006). 
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hiring individuals with PSM will increase organizational efficiency in the public 
sector as better matching of agents and principals with similar preferences reduces the 
need for high-powered incentives (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). In fact the use of high 
powered incentives may have adverse effects on public-sector performance. As shown 
by Benabou and Tirole (2006), monetary incentives decrease the reputational value of 
pro-social actions and thus reduce the overall utility from pro-social behaviour. 
Extrinsic rewards may then crowd out PSM: whilst higher wages increase the 
probability of filling a job vacancy, they decrease the expected average quality of job 
applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply (Delfgaauw and Dur; 
2007).17 
 
Conclusive empirical evidence of PSM amongst public-sector workers is however yet 
to be found. Some empirical research into PSM is discussed in the public 
administration literature: Brewer and Selden (1998) find evidence of PSM amongst 
whistle-blowers, but their sample comprises only public sector employees, thus they 
do not compare public sector workers with workers in other sectors. Crewson (1997) 
and Dilulio (1994) show that workers in the public sector report higher satisfaction 
with the intrinsic characteristics of work than workers in the private sector. Houston 
(2000) shows that public sector employees are more likely to place a higher value on 
the intrinsic rewards. Houston (2006) shows that public sector workers undertake 
more charitable activities than workers in the private sector. These studies however do 
not show whether it is the public sector that causes individuals to derive greater 
satisfaction from the intrinsic characteristics of their work or rather it is individuals 
who derive greater satisfaction from the intrinsic characteristics of public-sector work 
who are drawn to the public sector. 
 
Further, the empirical literature on the crowding-out effect of monetary incentives has 
not considered the effect of extrinsic rewards on public sector workers.18 Frey, 
Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996) and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show 
that people are less likely to accept that “Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) projects are 
                                                                                                                                            
Gregg, Grout, Ratcliffe, Smith and Windmeijer (2008) find that workers in the non-profit sector donate 
significantly more labour than workers in the private sectors. 
17 Crowding out of workers with PSM has also been attributed to unmotivated workers being attracted 
to the public sector (see Delfgaauw and Dur; 2008). 
18 Titmuss (1970) argued that monetary compensation undermines civic duty so that the introduction of 
monetary compensation would result in blood of lower quality being collected. 
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undertaken in their own town when they are offered monetary compensation. In an 
experimental study, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) show that individuals exert less 
effort when a small amount of monetary compensation is offered than when no 
compensation is offered. In Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) the introduction of a fine 
to parents who are late in collecting their children from school increases the rate of 
parents arriving late.19 Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) show that image motivation 
is crowded out by monetary incentives, meaning that monetary incentives are less 
likely to work in public pro-social activities and more likely to work in private pro-
social activities. Carpenter and Myers (2007) find that altruism and reputational 
concerns are positively related to individual's volunteering to be fire fighters. They 
also find that the positive effect that monetary incentives have on volunteering decline 
with reputational concerns, thus providing further evidence of extrinsic incentives 
crowding out pro-social behaviour. 
 
The crowding out hypothesis is especially important when we consider gender 
differences. Cronson and Gneezy (2009) find that the social preferences of women are 
more situationally specific and more malleable than men. The finding that women are 
more sensitive to social cues in determining appropriate behaviour implies that 
women may place higher value of a pro-social reputational than men. Benabou and 
Tirole (2006, pp.1662) argue if indeed women have higher weights on pro-social 
reputational concerns than men, then women are more likely to contribute more pro-
social actions in the absence of extrinsic rewards and women will also more likely 
respond more negatively than men to extrinsic rewards. Evidence of this is found by 
Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) who when studying the willingness to donate 
blood find that in the absence of monetary incentives women donate more blood than 
men. However, when monetary incentives are introduced, the blood donations of 
women drop significantly. When subjects are offered the choice to give the monetary 
payment to charity, the blood donations of women increase back to levels when there 
were no monetary incentives. The blood donations of men remain approximately the 
same throughout. Thus, I also investigate gender differences in this chapter. 
 
                                                 
19 See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey of the literature on crowding out and in of intrinsic 
motivation. 
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In this chapter, I use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to 
investigate whether PSM can explain individuals' propensity to move into public 
sector jobs. To proxy the utility derived from extrinsic aspects of the job I use 
workers' self-reported satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with job security and 
satisfaction with work hours.20 I consider satisfaction with work itself as a proxy for 
intrinsic rewards.21 Using predicted differentials for these variables, I estimate 
transition probabilities from the private into the public sector. 
 
The results show that the higher the predicted satisfaction with the work itself in the 
public sector, the higher the probability that an individual will make the transition 
from the private to the public sector. Instead, higher predicted satisfaction with the 
extrinsic characteristics does not raise the probability of transition. These results 
imply that individuals are drawn to the public sector by the intrinsic characteristics of 
working in the public sector rather than the extrinsic benefits, which is consistent with 
the existence of PSM evidence. Further, extrinsic rewards crowd out PSM, in that, 
higher predicted satisfaction differentials with the extrinsic characteristics of the job 
(i.e. satisfaction with hours of work, satisfaction with job security, and satisfaction 
with pay) decrease the likelihood of individuals moving into the public sector. 
Women experience crowding out of a greater magnitude than men. I find similar 
results by investigating transitions into different occupational classifications and into 
different sub-sectors of the public sector. 
 
This chapter also offers some of the first evidence on the nature of public sector rents 
based on domain satisfaction measures, thus contributing to a growing literature on 
public sector rents using subjective well-being measures (see e.g. Luechinger, Meier, 
and Stutzer, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2005; and Clark. 2004). Earlier studies on public 
sector rents focus mainly on wage differentials (see e.g. Bender 1998).  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
foundation of our empirical analysis and it derives the predictions. Section 3 discusses 
                                                 
20 The use of self-reported satisfaction data has been validated by several researchers. For example, it 
has been shown that job satisfaction predicts future quits (Freeman, 1978; Clark et al. 1998), it is 
negatively correlated with absenteeism (Clegg, 1983) and that it is positively correlated with 
productivity (Mangione and Quinn, 1975). See Diener (2000) for a review. 
21 Satisfaction with the work itself has been used as a proxy for the intrinsic utility derived from a job 
(Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2009). 
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the empirical methodology whilst section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes with some policy recommendations. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Foundations 
 
I borrow from Benabou and Tirole (2006) (hereafter BT) for the simple theoretical 
framework.22 I consider the behaviour of agents who choose to work in the public 
sector. ak denotes the level of pro-social activities undertaken by each agent in sector 
k at cost cak and yk denotes the (vector of) extrinsic rewards, enjoyed by agents in 
sector k, k=P,G, where k=P denotes the private sector and k=G denotes the public 
sector. Extrinsic rewards include wages, job security and working hours.  
denotes the difference in pro-social activities between the public and the private 
sector whilst  denotes the differential in extrinsic rewards. I take ak as 
given and assume that more pro-social activities are carried out in the public sector so 
that . The sector in which an agent works, the sectorial level of pro-social 
activities ak and the extrinsic rewards yk are publicly observable.  
 
Agents differ in two dimensions: their intrinsic valuation for pro-social activities and 
their valuation for extrinsic rewards. An agent's type is then defined by the intrinsic 
value  that he attaches to carrying out 1 unit of pro-social activities, where 
 may be negative to indicate that an individual may dislike pro-social activities, and 
by the value  that he attaches to enjoying 1 unit (in monetary units) of 
extrinsic rewards. ωi  and χi are random variables with cumulative distribution 
function H(ωi, χi). 
 
Agents have reputational concerns and wish to appear pro-social/altruistic. The value 
of reputation depends linearly on the posterior belief  of the agent's 
type ωi, given the sector k in which the agent works, the differential  in the level of 
pro-social activity between the two sectors, and the differential  in extrinsic rewards 
between the two sectors. The utility of agent i from working in sector k is 
 
 
                                                 
22 See also Benabou and Tirole (2003). 
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where  is the weight on reputational concerns, which may change across 
individuals. 
 
Initially, agents are randomly allocated between the private and the public sector. On 
the job, agents privately learn their type  and choose whether to remain in 
the sector they are in or to move to the other sector, given ak and yk. Types in the 
private sector for whom  will move to the public sector; types in the public 
sector for whom  will move to the private sector. Over time, therefore, 
types will separate between sectors: those (referred to as ''the highly intrinsically 
motivated'') for whom 
 
 
 
where 
 
 
 
will be in the public sector whilst those with low intrinsic motivation, , will be 
in the private sector.  denotes the reputational gain from working in the public 
sector compared to the private sector. 
 
Since initially half of the agents are in the private sector, the probability of transition 
from the private to the public sector is 
 
 
 
Within this framework, BT show as follows: 
1. Intrinsic motivation for pro-social activities is an important factor 
explaining why people wish to participate in pro-social activities. I add it that, 
to the extent that more activities are carried out in the public sectors, intrinsic 
motivation helps explaining the desire of people to work in the public sector. 
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Other things equal, people with higher intrinsic motivation wish the most to 
join the public sector. 
2. The greater the level of pro-social activities carried out in the public 
sector compared to the private sector (and thus ), the more intrinsically 
motivated people wish to move to the public sector. 
3. For given level of pro-social activities in the public sector (and thus ), 
an increase in extrinsic rewards in the public sector ( ) may reduce the 
reputational gain  from working in the public sector. 
Intuitively, as observers cannot observe agents' types, a signal extraction 
problem arises and an increase in extrinsic rewards generates two effects on 
reputation. First, new types are drawn to the public sector (i.e.  decreases). 
The new composition of the public sector thus comprises fewer intrinsically 
motivated agents and the ‘good reputation’ of working in the public sector 
decreases (as the new members have lower s than the old one, they drag 
down the group reputation for pro-social orientation). However, the stigma of 
working in the private sector also increases (as the members with high s 
move to the public sector). As such the reputational gain  of working in 
the public sector may increase or decrease (this is the “image spoiling effect of 
extrinsic rewards”). 
4. Because of (3), an increase in extrinsic rewards in the public sector 
( ), may crowd out intrinsic motivation, in the sense that it may reduce 
the number of agents who wish to work in the public sector ( ). 
5. To the extent that women care more about their reputation for pro-
social activities than men, crowding out is more likely to occur for women 
than for men. 
 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
 
I use data from the first fourteen waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) covering the period 1991-2004. The BHPS is a longitudinal survey of 
approximately 10,000 individuals in 5,500 households per year, providing a rich 
source of information of demographic and labour market characteristics, as well as 
information on individuals' subjective evaluation of their jobs and their economic 
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situation. Restricting the sample to full-time workers between the ages of 16 and 65 
results in 37384 and 25728 person-year observations for men and women 
respectively. Crucially, the panel nature of the data allows us to identify, during the 
sample period, 747 transitions from the private to the public sector, all initiated by the 
workers themselves voluntarily (i.e. quits), with no intervening unemployment or 
inactivity spells. 
 
In order to explore whether such transitions are driven or explained by PSM, I classify 
job attributes observed prior to and after each transition as intrinsic or as extrinsic. To 
make such a distinction operational, I consider wages, job tenure and hours of work to 
be extrinsic rewards, while the nature of the work itself to be an intrinsic reward. I 
take the view that individuals have a predetermined level of PSM, which is the result 
of environmental factors, such as parental modelling and socialization within social 
groups that individuals interact with or are part of. Because it is difficult to measure 
individuals' motives directly, I proxy such motives by using self-reported domain job 
satisfaction scores. Following the theoretical model in Section 2, I expect that 
satisfaction with intrinsic rewards is positively correlated with the probability of 
transition into the public sector. In contrast, due to reputational effects, satisfaction 
with extrinsic rewards should have little or even negative influence on individuals' 
decision to seek employment in the public sector. 
 
More formally, the probability that individual i makes the transition into the public 
sector can be written as 
 
. (1) 
 
In equation (1),  is an observed indicator variable taking the value 1 if an 
individual i moves into the public sector at time t and 0 otherwise. The vector  
represents individual and labour market characteristics at time t-1, the year prior to 
making the transition.23 It includes expected earnings differentials between the public 
and the private sector as well as expected satisfaction differentials for the various 
extrinsic and intrinsic job attributes under consideration.  is a random error term. 
                                                 
23 Full list of individual and labour variables used given in the appendix. 
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I use satisfaction with the work itself as a proxy of utility derived from intrinsic 
rewards of a job. I use satisfaction with pay, job security and working hours as 
proxies for utilities derived from extrinsic rewards.24 Earnings in both private and 
public sector employment are observed only for those in private employment and 
public employment respectively, and they are censored at zero. Because of this, firstly 
I estimate standard Mincer-type earnings functions corrected for selectivity bias (I 
give full results in the appendix) for men, women, and both men and women 
combined. Secondly, I use these estimates to calculate the expected earnings 
differential between the public and private sector  for each individual in my 
sample, irrespective of current status. Finally, these expected earnings differentials are 
then used when estimating equation (1), the transition into the public sector equation. 
In a similar fashion, I estimate differentials for satisfaction with pay 
, satisfaction with job security 
, satisfaction with hours worked 
, and satisfaction with the work itself (an intrinsic 
reward)  between the public and private sectors.25 
These predicted domain satisfaction differentials enter as additional regressors in the 
transition equation (1), which is written as, 
 
 
(2) 
 
The main hypothesis that PSM increases the probability of transition into the public 
sector implies a positive and significant coefficient . If extrinsic rewards exert little 
or no influence on individuals’ decision to become public sector employees, then the 
coefficients  to  will be statistically insignificant. Negative and statistically 
significant coefficients  to  are consistent with the crowding out hypothesis, 
whereby extrinsic rewards mitigate an individual's utility from the intrinsic rewards 
associated with the transition into the public sector. 
                                                 
24 Summary statistics are given in Table 1. 
25 We use the combined (men and women) earnings and satisfaction functions, and differentials for 
estimations where we observe too few transitions by gender. 
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I expand on our analysis by testing our hypothesis on transitions from the public to 
the private sector. This will allow me to gain a comparative perspective of the 
motivations for transition between the two sectors. In this case I calculate 
. I use the same procedure for the satisfaction differentials. This 
allows me to use the same hypothesis from equation (2) with the same signs. 
 
In addition, I expand my analysis by testing the hypothesis on transition into caring 
and non-caring jobs and transition into different government sub-sectors.26 Finally, I 
investigate whether the income levels of individuals affect their motivation to move to 
the public sector by testing our hypothesis on the lower and upper quartiles of real 
wages. 
 
Given that actual pay (as opposed to satisfaction with pay) is arguably the only the 
measure that provides individuals’ with any reputational return, the probit estimations 
were all repeated with the satisfaction with pay differential dropped as a right-hand 
side variable.27 
 
1.4 Results 
  
I begin by examining the number of transitions between the sectors in table 2. I 
observe that more women enter into caring jobs in the public sector when compared 
to entering non-caring jobs in the public sector. This is the opposite for men entering 
into the public sector, with more men entering into non-caring jobs than caring jobs. 
There are more individuals moving into non-caring jobs than caring jobs for both men 
and women moving into the private sector. Taking the view that the public sector 
offers more opportunity to carry out pro-social actions, these results suggest an 
important gender difference between men and women, that women are more pro-
socially motivated than men (Cronson and Gneezy, 2009). 
 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
                                                 
26 Caring refers to health, education, and social care. Non-caring refers to all other industries (Gregg, et 
al, 2009). 
27 This suggestion was given by the external examiner during the defence of this thesis. The results for 
these estimations are given in Tables B4-7. 
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Table 3 shows that on average the public sector has higher extrinsic rewards than the 
public sector. The real wage is on average significantly higher in the public sector 
than in the private sector for both men and women. Working hours are significantly 
less in the public sector than in the private sector (for both men and women). Public 
sector workers (both men and women) have significantly longer job tenure than 
private sector workers. This suggests that the public sector offers better job security 
than the private sector.28 These results are important because they show that the 
public sector has higher extrinsic rewards than the private sector on average. This 
means there is scope for the theoretical model and its predictions. That is, the public 
sector having higher extrinsic rewards may reduce the reputational (for being pro-
social) benefit for making the transition to the public sector because the high extrinsic 
rewards in the public sector make it harder to differentiate whether an individual's 
motive for moving to the public sector are to fulfil pro-social motivations or to satisfy 
extrinsic desires. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
 
I now examine the results that make use of observed transition into the public sector. 
Table 4 below gives the probit estimations for transition from the private to the public 
sector for men and women. In order to gain a comparative perspective, Table 4 also 
includes results for transition from the public to the private sector for both men and 
women. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
There is strong evidence for the main hypothesis: individuals are more likely to move 
to the public sector if they expect to enjoy greater satisfaction with the work itself in 
the public sector. Furthermore, higher predicted satisfaction with pay in the public 
sector will reduce the probability of moving to the public sector, thus providing 
evidence of the image spoiling effect of monetary rewards in the public sector. The 
satisfaction with job security differential is insignificant for men, but is positive and 
                                                 
28 This is consistent with previous studies. See e.g. Rama (1999) and Bender (1998). 
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significant for women. This suggests that job security is important for women when 
choosing a job. This is reinforced as the job security satisfaction differential is 
positive and significant for transition into the private sector as well. However, for men 
this provides evidence that men are not more likely to join the public service out of a 
desire to derive greater utility from job security. There is strong evidence that higher 
(predicted) utility with the number of hours worked in the public sector in fact 
reduces the probability of joining the public sector for both men and women. Thus, 
the results of the predicted satisfaction with pay and working hours differentials are 
consistent with the crowding out hypothesis, whereby extrinsic rewards mitigate an 
individual's utility from the intrinsic rewards associated with the transition into the 
public sector. 
 
This grouping of results shows that people join the public sector mainly because it 
offers individuals with PSM the opportunity to carry out more intrinsically satisfying 
work. Higher wages or better extrinsic rewards are not the driving force behind the 
transition. In fact, our results show that higher extrinsic rewards in the public sector 
crowd out PSM from the public sector.  That is, higher extrinsic rewards in the public 
sector make it less likely for individuals who are public service motivated to join the 
public sector. 
 
These findings are reinforced when I compare them to our findings for transition into 
the private sector from the public sector. I find that the satisfaction with the work 
itself differential is insignificant for both men and women. This means that 
individuals are not attracted by the intrinsic aspects of work in the private sector. 
Instead, the wage, satisfaction with job security, and satisfaction with working hours 
differential are positive and significant for women. The satisfaction with job security 
differential is positive and significant for men. This clearly shows that a move to the 
private sector is more likely the greater the utility derived from extrinsic rewards in 
the private sector. Therefore the move to the private sector is motivated by extrinsic 
rewards, whereas the move from the private to the public sector is motivated by 
intrinsic rewards (and mitigated by extrinsic rewards). 
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Table 5 contains probit estimation results for transition into caring and non-caring 
jobs in the public and private sectors.29 The results for transition into both caring and 
non-caring jobs in the public sector confirm the hypotheses. Transition into both 
caring and non-caring jobs is more likely the greater the satisfaction with work 
differential, i.e. the greater the amount of satisfaction derived from the intrinsic 
aspects of work in the public sector whereas extrinsic rewards mitigate this 
probability. I find similar results when I investigate transition into different sub-
sectors of the government in Table 6. In this case, the crowding out is of greatest 
magnitude for transition into the NHS and higher education. This is perhaps because 
these sub-sectors have a high proportion of caring jobs. 
 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here.] 
 
Finally I test whether the crowding out effect is affected by income. I give results for 
probit estimations for individuals that were in the lower quartile of earnings before the 
transition and individuals in the upper quartile of earnings in Table 7. These results 
show that there is a greater amount of crowding out for individuals with lower 
incomes. This is because both the satisfaction with pay and working hours 
differentials are negative and significant. However, the satisfaction with job security 
differential is positive and significant. This suggests that job security is important for 
individuals with low levels of income. There is no crowding out for individuals with 
higher income. However, transition into the public sector is still driven by satisfaction 
from the intrinsic aspects of working in the public sector as the satisfaction with work 
itself differential is positive and nearly significant at a 10% confidence level. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
 
The results for the estimations without the satisfaction with pay differential are given 
in Tables B4 to B7. These results lead to the same conclusions as the results above 
(that include the satisfaction with pay differential). The coefficients for the 
satisfaction with work itself, job security, and working hours differentials and the 
remaining right hand side variables, and level of significance are nearly the same as 
                                                 
29 These results are from a combined sample of both men and women. 
 49 
 
those from the estimates that include satisfaction with pay. The only notable 
difference lies with the actual pay differential whose sign remains the same but whose 
magnitude and significance increase when satisfaction with pay is not included in the 
estimations.  
 
The predicted satisfaction and real wage variables are linear combinations of a 
number of explanatory variables. The satisfaction and real wage equations are 
estimated using similar explanatory variables to the selection into the private and 
public sector equations that are used to generate the inverse mills ratios. It is not a 
problem for these equations to have identical explanatory variables (Johnson and 
DiNardo, 1997: p. 448), especially in the case where one is controlling for a large 
number of explanatory variables with a large sample. Therefore, there is no problem 
with the separate identification of the estimated coefficients through the variance 
covariance matrix.    
 
1.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
The results show that higher wages, satisfaction with pay, job security and working 
hours in the public sector are either insignificant in influencing the probability of 
transition to the public sector or reduce this probability. Instead, higher satisfaction 
with the intrinsic characteristics of work in the public sector increases the probability 
of transition to the public sector. Individuals are more likely to move due to higher 
satisfaction with the work itself in the public sector, as the public sector provides 
greater opportunity for these individuals to carry out their public service motivation. 
This grouping of results provides strong evidence of PSM and suggests that extrinsic 
rewards may crowd out intrinsic motivation. 
 
These results suggest that from an efficiency point of view, the public sector should 
lower wages and other extrinsic rewards for two reasons. Firstly, high wages in the 
public sector deter individuals with PSM from entering the public sector as high 
wages decrease their utility from this pro-social move because they are perceived to 
be “greedy”. Therefore lower wages and other extrinsic rewards allow for better 
matching as individuals with PSM will be more willing to work in the public sector. 
Secondly, a reduction in wages and other extrinsic rewards will reduce problems of 
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adverse selection in hiring new workers for the public sector. High wages in the 
public sector will also attract individuals who do not have PSM. These individuals 
require higher powered incentives to perform the same task compared to individuals 
with high levels of PSM and therefore are more costly than individuals with PSM. By 
offering lower wages the public sector will attract a higher proportion of individuals 
with PSM. 
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Chapter 2 
Does Public Service Motivation Adapt? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
An emerging theme in the recent economics literature is that in many circumstances it 
is intrinsic rather than extrinsic rewards that matter the most in a workplace (see e.g. 
Clark, 1997; Clark, 2001).  The same theme has been advanced in the public 
administration literature where intrinsic rewards are linked to workers’ motivation to 
accept employment in the public sector, often referred to as Public Service Motivation 
(PSM).30  Persuasive theoretical arguments highlight the importance of Public Service 
Motivation in underpinning employment relationships in the public sector, mainly 
based on the presumption that many aspects of public service provision are non-
contractible.  Consequently, hiring workers who are public service, or pro-socially, 
motivated helps to overcome incentive problems (Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2007) 
and to increase organizational efficiency, reducing the need for high-powered 
incentives (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence on PSM is sparse.  Existing studies find that public 
sector workers report high job satisfaction with intrinsic job attributes (Crewson, 
1997; Dilulio, 1994), they place high value on intrinsic rewards and they are highly 
likely to undertake charitable activities (Houston, 2000, 2006).   There is also 
evidence, not necessarily in the context of public sector employment, suggesting that 
pro-social motivation is associated with a crowding-out effect of monetary incentives.  
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) find, for example, that people are less likely to 
accept “Not In My Backyard” projects when they are offered a monetary reward.  In 
the same spirit, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show that individuals exert less effort 
when a small monetary compensation is offered. 
 
Chapter 1 provides empirical evidence on PSM focusing on transitions into public 
sector employment.  The results support the PSM hypothesis by showing that 
                                                 
30 Perry (1996) defines Public Service Motivation (PSM) as an individual's predisposition to respond to 
motives grounded primarily in public institutions. 
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individuals are more likely to make the transition into the public sector due to higher 
satisfaction with the nature of the work itself, a proxy for intrinsic rewards and PSM, 
rather than due to extrinsic job attributes. Yet, a question remains whether the initial 
boost in satisfaction with the nature of the work itself, associated with accepting 
public sector employment, dissipates with job tenure. 
 
In this chapter, I answer the above question using data from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) to explore patterns of overall and domain job satisfaction 
measures for workers who made the transition from the private into the public sector.  
Importantly, the longitudinal nature of the BHPS data allows this researcher to follow 
up workers in consecutive annual interviews prior and after the transition and 
therefore to test the hypothesis that PSM adapts back to pre-transition levels.  As 
psychological explanations of adaptation suggest, new stimuli and changing 
circumstances cause deviations of well-being from a baseline level, but such 
deviations are likely to be temporary. 31  In the context of the present chapter, 
accepting a job in the public sector is the new stimulus and I am particularly 
interested in exploring whether any possible increase in overall and domain 
satisfaction dissipates with tenure in the new job.  Focusing on workers who made the 
transition from the private to the public sector, I find no evidence of adaptation of 
satisfaction with the nature of the work itself, our proxy for PSM, back to pre-
transition levels.  Interestingly, this is not the case for workers who moved from the 
public to the private sector where I find stronger evidence of adaptation, especially for 
women for whom the boost in satisfaction with the nature of the work itself does not 
last beyond the first year on the new private sector job.  Evidence of a rapid 
adaptation of PSM towards pre-transition levels is also strong for women who change 
jobs within the public sector, which is not the case for men.  Men who change jobs 
within the public sector enjoy a more permanent boost in their satisfaction with the 
nature of the work itself.  For both men and women, the boost in satisfaction with the 
nature of the work itself associated with job switching within the private sector is very 
short-lived. 
 
                                                 
31  Economists have increasingly showed an interest in adaptation level theory and its potential 
implications for economic analysis (e.g. Lucas, Clark, Georgellis and Diener, 2003, 2004; Clark, 
Diener, Georgellis and Lucas, 2008; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). 
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This chapter contributes also to the broader debate about the temporal stability of job 
satisfaction, a relatively unexplored theme in the economics literature.  A notable 
exception is the study by Chi, Freeman and Kleiner (2006) who explicitly focus on 
how workers’ job satisfaction responds to changing jobs and on how it evolves over 
time following such job changes.  In contrast, industrial and social psychology 
researchers have devoted more effort into the dynamics of job satisfaction and they 
tend to find that job satisfaction is relatively stable, but with an emerging consensus 
that such stability decreases with job tenure and labour turnover. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review 
of recent findings on the link between job switching and job satisfaction, highlighting 
some of the factors that could affect the temporal stability of job satisfaction.  Section 
3 outlines the methodology and describes the data.  Section 4 discusses the results and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Job Switching and Job Satisfaction: Related Literature 
 
Following Freeman's (1978) seminal study, job satisfaction has been at the core of 
economic analysis, with ample empirical evidence linking job satisfaction with actual 
observed behaviour in the labour market such as absenteeism, productivity, and quits 
(see e.g. Akerlof et al. 1988; Clark et al. 1998).  In a recent development in the 
literature, Chi, Freeman and Kleiner (2006) follow a new line of inquiry by examining 
how job satisfaction changes over time when employees change jobs.  Their findings 
suggest that workers who voluntarily leave their jobs tend to experience an increased 
long-term job satisfaction with their new jobs.  In the case of multiple quitters they 
find the increase in job satisfaction is only transitory.  Such findings supplement 
earlier findings in other social sciences where the issue of the temporal stability of job 
satisfaction has attracted considerably more attention.  Among others, Breeden (1993) 
finds that subjects that change job and occupations report significantly higher job 
satisfaction than subjects that did not change job or occupation.  De Rijk, Nijhuis, and 
Alexanderson (2009) find that upon returning to work after illness, women report 
significantly higher job satisfaction than before.  
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In an attempt to explain changes in job satisfaction, Bowling et al. (2005) review the 
existing evidence and propose an integrated model of the stability of job satisfaction 
based on three alternative, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations: (i) 
workers' dispositions to work-related attributes; (ii) adaptation-level theory; and (iii) 
opponent process theory.  Such explanations emphasize the dynamic nature and the 
time element inherent in any subjective evaluation of one's job situation and work-
related circumstances. 
 
Changes in job satisfaction are argued to be determined by person effect and/or 
workplace effects.  The person effect approach posits that person (genetic) 
dispositional effects affect job satisfaction as a trait.  This leads to the conclusion that 
workers are innately satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs and thus job satisfaction 
should not change when workers quit and move on to new jobs (Arvey el al, 1989, 
1991; Cropanzano et al, 1993; and Judge and Hulin, 1993).32   
 
The workplace effect approach argues that the job characteristics and the work 
environment affect job satisfaction, thus some job characteristics and workplace 
conditions positively affect job satisfaction whilst others negatively affect job 
satisfaction.  Job satisfaction and its responsiveness to workplace or organisational 
change are investigated mainly in the related disciplines of organisational behaviour, 
organisational psychology and human resource management.  Researchers investigate 
how job changes impact job satisfaction and how workplace reorganisation impacts 
job satisfaction.  The studies that investigate the impact of workplace reorganisation 
find that there is a decrease in job satisfaction and other employee well-being 
measures immediately before and during reorganisation.  Job satisfaction is found to 
increase after reorganisation.  This decrease in job satisfaction is attributed to 
uncertainty during reorganisation and is found in many different forms of workplace 
reorganisation, including privatisation (Nelson, Cooper, and Jackson, 1995), 
reorganisation of local government (Pollard, 2001) and intra-company job transfers 
(Gerpott, 1990).  Firm sponsored training is found to increase job satisfaction for men 
(Georgellis and Lange, 2007).   
 
                                                 
32 See Dormann and Zapf (2001) for an overview of this literature. 
 55 
 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
I use data from the first seventeen waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), covering the period 1991 to 2007.  The BHPS is a longitudinal survey of 
approximately 10,000 individuals in 5,500 households per year. It provides 
information on demographic and labour market characteristics, as well as important 
information on individuals’ subjective evaluation of various aspects of their jobs and 
their economic situation.  I restrict the sample to include full time workers aged 
between 18 and 65 years, resulting in an effective sample of 45,397 and 32,727 
person-year observations for men and women respectively.  The panel nature of the 
BHPS data allows this researcher to identify workers who made the transition from 
one job and/or sector to another and to follow these workers up to four years prior and 
at least 5 years after the transition.   Table 1 gives the number of leads and lags 
observed for men and women.   
 
In Table 1 it can be observed that the largest numbers of job transitions are job 
transitions within the private sector, followed by job transitions within the public 
sector. This shows that the private sector has a much higher amount of labour 
turnover than the public sector and this is more so in the case of men.  In contrast, 
more women than men change jobs within the public sector.  This suggests that the 
public sector has qualities that allow women greater flexibility with changing jobs 
than the private sector.  Across sector transitions are fewer than within sector 
transitions for both men and women.  Interestingly, there are more women than men 
that move from the private to the public sector, while men are more likely to move 
from the public to the private sector.   Such stylised facts are suggestive that women 
are more pro-socially motivated than men (Cronson and Gneezy, 2009).  The 
multivariate analysis that follows offers a more definitive answer as to whether 
women are more likely to move into the public sector because of Public Service 
Motivation rather than other pecuniary aspects of public sector employment. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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Following Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2009), I use satisfaction with the nature of the 
work itself to capture the intrinsic utility derived from a job, which in the present 
context I associate with Public Service Motivation.  For comparison reasons and to 
identify whether the patterns of temporal variation in satisfaction with the nature of 
the work itself associated with transitions into the public sector  are unique, I explore 
variation in other domain satisfaction measures, including satisfaction with pay, 
satisfaction with job security and satisfaction with hours as well as overall job 
satisfaction.  Overall job satisfaction and domain satisfaction measures in the BHPS 
are reported as ordinal categorical variables on a scale 1 to 7 (with 1 meaning 
completely dissatisfied and 7 meaning completely satisfied).  Table 2 shows the 
distribution of the various job satisfaction measures for men and women respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
I investigate how job satisfaction and its domains move around the time a worker 
changes job.  While the primary focus is on whether satisfaction with the nature of 
work itself dissipates following a transition into the public sector, I also examine 
transitions from the public into private sector and transitions within the same sector 
(public and private).  Given the panel nature of the data allows this researcher to 
observe individuals before and after changing jobs, I calculate lag (identifying years 
since move) and lead (identifying years until move) dummies.33  For example, having 
identified transition events into the public sector, I then construct lag variables of the 
event so that the incidence of being in the public sector for less than a year, denoted 
by PUB0it=1, is identified by the individual being currently in the public sector 
whereas being in the private sector in the previous year (i.e. PUBt = 1 but  PUBt-11).  
Similarly, being in the public sector for one to two years, PUB1it=1, is identified as 
PUBt=1, PUBt-1=1 and PUBt-21, and so on for longer lags.  The last category is a 
catch all category for individuals that moved to the public sector five or more years 
previously from the private sector. 
 In order to identify the anticipation of moving to the public sector, I create 
lead variables so that an individual moving to the public sector within a year is 
                                                 
33 This is the same methodology used by Clark et al (2008) to examine adaptation and anticipation 
effects for major life and economic events, including unemployment, marriage, divorce, birth of child, 
widowhood and layoff.  In this context, the event is getting a new job. 
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identified as being currently in the private sector but will move to the public sector in 
the following interview, PUB1,it  implies PUBt+1=1 and PUBt1.  An individual 
moving to the public sector within one to two years, itPUB ,2 , is identified as 
PUBt+2=1, PUBt+11 and PUBt1, and so on for longer leads. The same procedures 
are used for transition from the public to the private sector, transitions within the 
public sector and transitions within the private sector. 
 To test the significance of lags and leads effects (i.e. adaptation and 
anticipation) in job satisfaction prior and after the transition into public sector 
employment, I estimate fixed-effects regressions for lags (equation 1) and leads 
(equation 2) of the following form: 
  
Sit i Xit 0PUB0it 1PUB1it 2PUB2it 3PUB3it 4PUB4it 5PUB5it it ,  (1) 
 
where S  stands for job satisfaction and X is a vector of demographic and job 
characteristics, includes marital status, education, number of children, age, income 
(gross monthly income), health, regional and year dummies.  For different 
specifications of equation (1) S  will be overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, 
satisfaction with job security, satisfaction with the work itself, and satisfaction with 
the hours worked.  Similarly, to test anticipation I estimate the following equation 
with lead event dummies:  
 
Sit  i  Xit  4PUB4,it  3PUB3,it  2PUB2,it 1PUB1,it  it .   (2) 
 
I expect the lead coefficients to be negative. Negative and significant lead coefficients 
imply that dissatisfaction with that aspect of work is a reason for individuals to 
change jobs.  
 
2.4 Results 
 
Table 3 compares the mean overall job satisfaction and domain satisfaction of 
workers that changed job and/or employment sector to that of workers who did not 
change jobs (stayers).  For both men and women, the means of overall job satisfaction 
and its domains are higher in the year after the change than in the year leading up to 
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the change. This is consistent with findings by Chi, Freeman and Kleiner (2006). 
Stayers in the public sector enjoy greater satisfaction (overall job satisfaction and its 
domains) than individuals that move to the public sector. This is consistent with Clark 
(2004), Luechinger, Meier, and Stutzer (2005), and Clark and Senik (2006) who find 
evidence of higher job and life satisfaction in the public sector than in the private 
sector.  
 
The results show important gender differences when consideration is made of 
satisfaction with the work itself, our proxy for utility derived from intrinsic aspects of 
work. For women, the move from the private to the public sector results in 
significantly higher satisfaction with the work itself compared to women who stay in 
the private sector. For men, this same transition results in mean satisfaction with the 
work itself that is not significantly different from stayers. This means that for women, 
moving to the public sector has a greater impact on intrinsic motivation than it does 
for men. This suggests that women maybe more public service motivated than men 
(Cronson and Gneezy, 2009).  
 
Interestingly, satisfaction with working hours is higher in the year before leaving the 
public sector than in the year after a move to the private sector for both men and 
women. This clearly shows that the public sector has better working hours than the 
private sector. 
 
Main Results 
 
In this section, I summarise the main results of the multivariate analysis in Figures 1-
8.  More specifically, Figures 1-8 present the estimated coefficients for the lag and 
lead dummies from equations 1 and 2, controlling for standard demographic 
characteristics (see appendix for results in tables).  The results are generally consistent 
with patterns of anticipation prior to changing job and/or employment sector.  This is 
because there is a statistically significant deterioration in overall job satisfaction prior 
to the transition into a new job.  This is also true for reported domain satisfaction 
measures whereby a general dissatisfaction with all aspects of employment precedes 
the move into a new job and/or sector.  Such findings confirm previous evidence 
supporting the importance of job satisfaction as a determinant of quits (e.g., Akerlof, 
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Rose and Yellen 1988; Clark, Georgellis and Sanfey, 1998).  Interestingly, the results 
hint to the fact that perhaps it is not job satisfaction in the last year prior to transition 
that matters the most in explaining quits, but instead it is a pattern of deterioration in 
satisfaction in the four years prior to the transition.  The exception is that both men 
and women enjoy high significantly positive satisfaction with working hours before 
leaving the public sector (and moving the private sector).  This suggests that the 
public sector has better working hours for both men and women (Bender, 1998; and 
Chapter 1 of this thesis).  
 
Following the transition into the public sector, there is an immediate improvement in 
overall job satisfaction as well as an improvement in domain satisfaction measures for 
both men and women.  This increase is significant for at least five years, suggestive of 
a slow and possibly incomplete adaptation to pre-transition levels of overall job 
satisfaction.  The same story emerges in the case of satisfaction with work itself, our 
proxy for intrinsic or public service motivation.  Workers who move into public 
sector employment enjoy increased levels of satisfaction with the work itself that 
persists for at least five years after the transition.  For both men and women, public 
service motivation is indeed a motivating factor for accepting employment into the 
public sector. 
 
Transition into the public sector is also associated with increased satisfaction with the 
extrinsic rewards of work (i.e. pay, job security, and working hours) for several years 
after transition.  Most notably women have increased satisfaction with job security for 
at least five years after transition.  This is perhaps due to the public sector having 
better pay, job security and working hours (Bender, 1998; see Chapter 1 of this 
thesis).  The only exception is satisfaction with pay for women which decreases after 
the first year in the public sector.  This suggests women are less interested with pay 
when they work in the public sector.   
 
For men, there is a sustained increase in job satisfaction for at least five years after 
making the transition from the public to the private sector (figures 3 and 4).  
However, this increase is strongly associated with sustained increases in satisfaction 
with job security and pay for men.  This implies that men that move from the private 
to the public sector are more extrinsically motivated (see Chapter 1 of this thesis).  
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Women have an increase in overall job satisfaction when they move to the private 
sector, but this decreases and becomes insignificant after just one year in the private 
sector.  Only satisfaction with job security remains significantly positive for at least 
five years.  These results suggest that private sector employment does not increase the 
long term well being of women. Taking the view that the public sector gives more 
opportunity to individuals to carry out pro-social actions, the results for transition into 
the public sector are consistent with the view that women derive greater satisfaction 
from being pro-social (Cronson and Gneezy, 2009).  
 
In summary, three main findings emerge from comparing the analysis of anticipation 
and adaptation to changing jobs from the private to the public sector and transition 
from the public to the private sector.  
1. Moving to the public sector significantly increases overall job 
satisfaction and satisfaction with the work itself (our proxy for utility derived 
from intrinsic aspects of the job) for both men and women. 
2. The size and duration of boost in overall job satisfaction and its 
domains is dependent on which sector individuals are moving into.  The boost 
is sustained for at least five years for transition into the public sector.  For 
transition into the private sector (from the public sector); the boost in job 
satisfaction for men is associated with increased utility from extrinsic rewards 
and the boost completely dissipates after one year for women.  
3. Transition into a new sector is preceded by steep decline in job 
satisfaction and its domains for men (with the exception satisfaction with 
working hours).  For women transition into the public sector is preceded by a 
sharp decline in job satisfaction and its domains.  However, transition into the 
private sector is only associated with a decline in satisfaction with job 
security.  This again shows that women have a strong preference for work in 
the public sector, with them only leaving the public sector because of job 
insecurity. 
These results suggest that for both men and women, public service motivation is 
indeed a motivating factor for accepting employment into the public sector.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 give results for transition into new jobs within the public sector.  
Overall job satisfaction adapts rapidly to the baseline within the first two years of 
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moving to a new public sector job for both men and women.  Interestingly, men enjoy 
significantly higher satisfaction with the work itself for at least five years after 
starting a new job within the public sector.  This provides further evidence of intrinsic 
or public service motivation within the public sector.  Women enjoy increased 
satisfaction with job security for at least three years after moving into new public 
sector jobs.  
 
Figures 7 and 8 summarise the results for job transitions within the private sector.  
Overall job satisfaction declines rapidly after an initial sharp increase for both male 
and female workers, with evidence of full adaptation within two years of moving to a 
new job within the private sector.  In the long term, women experience negative 
overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, and satisfaction with the work itself 
from moving to a new private sector job.  Men have increased satisfaction with pay 
and job security for three and four years respectively.  However, men have negative 
satisfaction with the work itself in the private sector three years after moving into new 
jobs in the private sector.  
 
Taken together, the results show that individuals respond differently to employment 
in the public and private sector.  Transition into the public sector is associated with a 
long term increase in job satisfaction for both men and women. Importantly, these 
results highlight the existence and persistence of intrinsic motivation in the public 
sector, suggesting that indeed, public service motivation does not adapt. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The recent interest in the process of adaptation, coupled with the wider availability of 
longitudinal data, is likely to spur a renewed interest among economists about the 
dynamics of job satisfaction.  In this spirit, the purpose of this chapter has been to 
investigate patterns of job satisfaction as workers make transitions from private to 
public sector employment, and comparing these with transitions from the public to the 
private sector and transitions within the sectors.  Within such a context, I paid 
particular attention to whether intrinsic motivation in the public sector (also referred 
to as public service motivation) adapts.  The results suggest that both men and women 
who accept public sector employment enjoy a boost in their satisfaction with work 
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itself in the public sector (our proxy for public service motivation) for up to five years 
on the job, as well as increased overall job satisfaction.  This is welcome evidence for 
those who advocate the benefit of having intrinsically motivated people working in 
the public sector.  As Francois (2000) argues, agents who care more about the output 
will have less incentive to shirk in the public sector than in the private sector.  
Individuals who are intrinsically motivated are more willing to donate labour in the 
public sector (Grout and Yong (2003) and Grout and Schnedler (2006)).  Gregg, 
Grout, Ratcliffe, Smith, and Windmeijer (2008) find that workers in the non-profit 
sector donate significantly more labour than workers in the private sector. 
Furthermore, hiring individuals with PSM will increase organisational efficiency in 
the public sector as better matching of agents and principals with similar preferences 
reduces the need for high-powered incentives (Besley and Ghatak, 2005).  The recent 
and growing literature on PSM argues that the public sector will benefit from hiring 
individuals with PSM, which could result in less use of high-powered incentives in 
the public sector.  In this chapter, I argue that the importance of such potential 
benefits is not undermined because the initial boost in PSM following hiring does not 
dissipate.  In this respect, the research is among the first to explore dynamic aspects of 
PSM, highlighting the need for further empirical evidence on the process of PSM 
adaptation. 
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Chapter 3 
Regulatory Risk, Reputation and Underinvestment 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
I argue that reputational concerns increase the level of government intervention 
resulting in contracted firms having reduced incentives to improve project quality, as 
they give the government an incentive to step in and take over the project. That is, 
reputational concerns increase regulatory risk, which causes firms to reduce quality 
(or output) improving firm specific investments. 
 
Regulatory risk is the risk associated with the potential for laws and regulations 
related to a given industry, country, or type of security to change and thus impact 
relevant projects and investments. Researchers have found that the threat of 
appropriation that regulatory risk creates results in low quality project valuations and 
outcomes. Riddiogough (1995) finds that threatening regulatory taking of land by 
local authorities adversely affects land value when the authorities offer less than full 
compensation. Ishii and Yan (2004) argue that uncertainty regarding possible 
comprehensive regulatory restructuring in the U.S. electricity industry leads to firms 
delaying their investment decisions. This allows firms to gather information and 
assurances over possible future regulatory changes. However, very few researchers 
have attempted to fully explain why governments may decide to intervene in 
regulated industries and procurement projects. Recently Panteghini and Scarpa (2008) 
have explained regulatory risk by considering profitability in price-capped industries. 
They argue that price-cap rules suffer from a credibility problem and introduce 
regulatory risk if the firm makes large profits. They show that a well designed profit 
sharing system can be a mechanism to reduce regulatory risk. In this chapter, I argue 
that reputational concerns are also an important source of regulatory risk. I show that 
reputational concerns increase regulatory risk by increasing the level of government 
intervention above the optimal level.  
 
I construct a model where government intervention and the reputational concerns of 
the government result in under investment of quality improving effort by a contractor. 
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I model the government as being one of two types: competent, i.e. it can correctly 
identify the type of project, and incompetent, i.e. it cannot correctly identify the type 
of project. The project can be either good or bad. A good project is intrinsically of 
higher quality and can be successfully carried out by either the government or private 
firm, however I assume the government is more likely to provide a successful 
outcome than a private firm on a good project. Only private firms can provide 
successful outcomes if the project is bad, and this only after making firm specific 
investments. The government wishes to maximise its reputation for being competent 
that is held by an evaluator (e.g. the electorate). Importantly, if a private firm has been 
awarded the contract, the government can decide to step in and take over the project if 
its belief that the project is good is high enough and it can gain a better reputation 
from doing so. In mixed strategy equilibrium I find that reputational concerns by the 
government cause the incompetent decision makers to step in more often than is 
optimal. This results in the contracted private firm producing less than optimal firm 
specific investment. This result contradicts much of the literature on reputational 
concerns that argues that reputational concerns improve performance. 
 
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows: the following section gives related 
literature. Section 3 gives an outline of the model. Section 4 gives the benchmark 
results of the analysis by considering the case with no reputational concerns. Section 
5 analyses the behaviour of the players when the principal has reputational concerns. 
We conclude in section 6. 
 
3.2 Related Literature  
 
3.2.1 Regulatory Risk 
 
Guasch and Straub (2006) and Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2008) investigate how 
regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks and concession 
contract characteristics affect the probability of contract renegotiation. They find that 
having regulatory institutions greatly reduces the probability of renegotiation by 
deterring opportunistic renegotiations. However, they do not investigate the impact of 
regulatory risk on performance. In the model, I show that incompetent governments 
(decision makers) want to excessively intervene in public projects as a means of 
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enhancing their reputations for being competent. Regulatory risk is driven by 
reputational concerns. This chapter is important because it offers new insights that 
help explain poor performance in procurement. 
 
Several authors have investigated the effect of regulatory risk on share volatility and 
systematic risk. Robinson and Taylor (1998) find that the expected volatility of 
regional electricity companies’ share returns increases after significant regulatory 
events in the UK. Buckland and Fraser (2001) find that political and regulatory risk 
influences the systematic risk faced by shareholders. Pescetto (2008) finds that 
regulation competition and quality announcements can have a significant impact on 
the systematic risk of the water industry in England and Wales. These papers consider 
the impact of regulatory risk on the share valuations of companies. They do not 
attempt to explain the cause of regulatory risk. I argue that the reputational concerns 
of governments are the source of regulatory risk, thus giving an explanation for 
regulatory risk. These papers also do not consider the impact of regulatory risk on the 
incentives faced by agents in the firms. In this chapter, I investigate the impact of 
possible government intervention on the level of firm specific investments by private 
firms contracted by the government.  
 
3.2.2 Reputational Concerns in Decision Making 
 
Reputational concerns are shown to enhance commitment power and thus induce 
higher effort levels. Reputational concerns thus act as implicit contracts. Holmstrom 
(1999) and Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) show how career concerns provide 
incentives for agents to exert effort. Other ways in which reputational concerns have 
an impact on behaviour have been analysed. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and 
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2000) show how career concerns lead to herding, i.e. where 
players ignore their own signals of the state of the world and follow the actions of 
other players. Levy (2004) demonstrates how reputational concerns lead to anti-
herding, i.e. where players ignore their signals of the state of the world (that other 
players have also received and acted upon) and choose actions that are different from 
other players in order to distinguish themselves. 
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However, there is a small and growing literature that investigates the negative effects 
of reputational concerns. Our paper is related to several of these papers. Morris (2001) 
considers a case where there is an advisor and an uninformed decision maker with 
identical preferences, which implies that the advisor has a current incentive to 
truthfully reveal her information. However, the advisor will have a reputational 
incentive to lie if the uninformed decision maker believes that the advisor is biased in 
favour of one decision. No information is conveyed in equilibrium if the advisor's 
reputational concerns are strong enough. In a repeated game, it is shown that the 
advisor (with the same preferences as the decision maker) will distort his revelation 
from the truthful one in the first period because she wants her opinion to be valuable 
in future periods. Morris calls this the “political correctness effect”. 
 
Ely and Valimaki (2003) argue that in some cases when the nature of the task 
undertaken naturally has a high frequency of bad observations, this leads the principal 
to believe that a good agent is bad. In such a case, a good agent will try to build a 
good reputation by reducing the frequency of these bad events, even though it is not 
optimal to do so. The principal will anticipate this and therefore a good agent 
becomes just as unfavoured as a bad agent to the principal. In both these papers, it is 
shown that in some cases an agent will have a desire to deviate from her preference 
due to the agent having reputational concerns. This differs with our work where it is 
the reputational concerns of the principal that give rise to the agent's under investment 
problem. 
 
Several authors have investigated the adverse effects on public spending of 
reputational concerns. Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) argue that politicians fund 
wasteful projects as a means to signal their diligence to voters, and voters reward 
them for this. Coate and Morris (1995) argue that when voters have imperfect 
information the predispositions of politicians and the impact of policies, then 
politicians may use inefficient methods of redistribution. I improve on this by not 
only examining how reputational concerns affect the decision making process, but 
also by examining how the reputational concerns of a decision maker affect the 
investment incentives of other parties in contractual relationships. 
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3.3 The Model 
 
3.3.1 The Players and the General Setting 
 
There are two periods and three players; a decision maker (D), a private firm (F), and 
an evaluator (E). At the beginning of period 1, D and F enter a contractual 
relationship to carry out a project and F begins undertaking the project. At the end of 
period 1, D can continue the contract with F or decide to step in. If D decides not to 
step in, F undertakes the project in period 2. If D decides to step in, he (D) will 
undertake provision of the project in period 2. The outcome of the project (V) is 
observable at the end of period 2.  
 
The project can be of two types, good (G) or bad (B), i.e. . The probability 
that a project is good is g, i.e. . The project can achieve one of two 
outcomes, 0 or V (high or desired outcome), i.e. , at the end of period 2. If 
the project is good ( ) and being undertaken by D, the probability of achieving 
outcome V is r, i.e. . If the project is good ( ) and being 
undertaken by F, the probability of achieving outcome V is s, i.e. 
. If the project is bad ( ) and being undertaken by D, the 
probability of outcome V is 0, i.e.  . If the project is bad 
( ) and being undertaken by F, the probability of outcome V is p, i.e. 
. p is the result of a firm specific investment by F, and it is 
costly. This cost is denoted as . I assume the firm specific investment is 
made in first period and that V is high enough that the expected continuation value of 
the project is positive. Therefore the project is always worth continuing and it must be 
kept with F or taken in house by D. I assume r>s. This implies that G has a greater 
ability or capacity to undertake a good project.  
 
The type of the project is observed by the private firm and the competent decision 
maker (D=H) during period 1. If the project is bad the amount of firm specific 
investment, and whether the investment is made, is private and is only observed by 
the private firm. At the end of the second period the outcome y is observed by all the 
players. 
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3.3.1.1 The Decision Maker 
 
The decision maker D can be of two types, competent (H) or incompetent (L), i.e. 
. The probability that the decision maker is competent is γ, i.e. 
. Only the decision maker knows his type. The decision maker has two 
strategies, to step in (i) or not step in (n), i.e. d=i,n. If the decision maker is competent 
(D=H), the decision maker will know the type of the project (θ) at the end of period 1. 
If the decision maker is incompetent (D=L), the decision maker will not know the 
type of the project (θ). The decision maker has reputational concerns, in that he 
maximises the posterior belief of E that he is competent. The decision by D to step in 
(d=n) or not step in (d=n) is observed by all the players. 
 
3.3.1.2 The Private Firm 
 
We restrict attention to simple linear contracts. If the outcome of the project is V, i.e. 
y=V, F receives kV, where 0<k<1. The private firm maximises: 
. The probability of achieving outcome V when the firm makes 
the firm specific investment, p, is unobservable to D and E. 
 
3.3.1.3 The Evaluator 
 
The evaluator E observes the decision made by the decision maker, d, at the end of 
first period, and observes the outcome of the project, y, at the end of the second 
period. I let  denote the posterior belief of E, given that the decision d and the 
outcome y are observed by E. The evaluator updates his belief that D is competent, 
, at the end of second period. 
 
3.3.2 Timing 
 
Period 1. At the beginning of period 1, nature moves and randomly selects a project 
of either type  or , and a decision maker either of type D=H or D=L. 
Also at the beginning of period 1, the private firm is awarded the contract and begins 
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working on the project. The private firm and the competent decision maker (D=H) 
then observe the type of the project ( ). 
  
During period 1, if the project is bad the private firm can privately make a firm 
specific investment. This is not observed by the other players. 
  
At the end of period 1, the decision maker chooses d, i.e. whether to step or to 
continue with the private firm. This is observable to all the players in the game. 
  
Period 2. The outcome y of the project is realised and observed. The evaluator 
updates his belief that the decision maker is competent, . The private firm receives 
. 
  
3.4 With No Reputational Concerns 
 
3.4.1 First Best 
 
I start by considering the case where all strategies and types are observable, and the 
decision maker does not have reputational concerns. I proceed as follows. First I study 
the behaviour of the decision maker. Then I analyse the incentives of the private firm 
to make firm specific investments. I have two possible cases. Firstly, I assume that, 
even when the private firm exerts no effort ( ), the expected payoff to society of 
having a private firm undertake the project at the beginning of period 1 is greater than 
the expected payoff to society of having decision maker undertake the project, i.e. 
. In this case, it is optimal for the private firm to undertake 
provision of the project from the beginning of period 1, regardless of the level of 
effort that it will exert. Alternatively, I can assume that, even when the firm is 
expected to exert maximum effort, the expected payoff to society of having the 
decision maker undertake the project from the beginning of period 1 is greater than 
the expected payoff to society if the project was being undertaken by the private firm, 
i.e. . In this case it is optimal for the decision maker to 
undertake the project from the beginning of period 1. 
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I begin by analysing the case were the private firm undertakes provision at the 
beginning of period 1, i.e. we assume . 
 
When types are observable, the decision maker cannot engage in reputation building. 
However, the decision maker is a member of society and he receives a portion  of the 
outcome (V). I assume that society is large, therefore the portion of the outcome 
received by the decision maker is very small but is positive, i.e. . 
 
The first best equilibrium is as follows: the decision maker D will choose to step in 
( ) if the project is good ( ). The decision maker will not step in, choosing 
to continue with the private firm ( ) if the project is bad ( ). 
 
This equilibrium is explained as follows. If , if D chooses , the expected 
payoff to society is . If , the expected payoff to society is . Since we 
assume , when , D always chooses . If . If D chooses  
the expected payoff to society is 0. If , the expected payoff to society is . 
Since , when , D always chooses . 
 
Therefore, when there are no reputational concerns, the decision maker makes the 
socially efficient decision. If the project is good ( ), the decision maker D 
chooses to step in ( ). This ensures the highest possible expected payoff to 
society ( ) when the project is good. If the project is bad ( ), the decision 
maker D chooses to continue with the private firm ( ). Society receives the 
highest possible expected payoff ( ) for when the project is bad. Given the strategy 
of the decision maker, the private firm will choose the amount of firm specific 
investment to make if the project is bad. 
 
In the first best base, if , the optimal level of p is where 
 
 
 
This leads to 
 71 
 
 
  (1) 
 
3.4.2 No Reputational Concerns 
 
Suppose now that the decision maker does have reputational concerns so that he just 
maximizes ߝV. The decision maker will then take the efficient decision: D will choose 
to step in ( ) if the project is good ( ) and not step in ( ) if the project 
is bad ( ). 
 
It then follows that the private firm will make a level of investment that maximizes 
 
 
Which leads to the first best  
 
 
  
 
3.5 With Reputational Concerns 
 
In the section I first analyse the decision making behaviour of the decision maker 
when he has got reputational concerns. I then analyse how this impacts the incentives 
of a private firm to make firm specific investments on a bad project. 
 
With reputational concerns, I assume the decision maker maximises the evaluator's ex 
post belief that D is competent ( ) and the portion of the outcome the decision 
maker receives, i.e. . However since , the decision maker simply 
maximises the evaluator's ex post belief that D is competent, i.e. .   
 
3.5.1 The Evaluator’s Ex-Post Beliefs 
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To determine the evaluator's ex-post beliefs I postulate an equilibrium where the 
competent decision maker steps in if and only if the project is good, whilst the 
incompetent decision maker steps in with probability z. Given this equilibrium, I 
derive the evaluator’s posterior belief using Bayes’ rule. In equilibrium, upon 
observing outcome  and the decision maker stepping in ( ), the evaluator's 
updated belief that the decision maker is competent is:34 
 
 
 
z is the probability that an incompetent decision maker will step in. The evaluator's 
updated belief in this case is the probability that the decision maker is competent, 
since a competent decision maker steps in when the project is good ( ) and 
achieves outcome V with probability r, divided by the probability of the decision 
maker stepping in and achieving outcome V ( ). The probability of 
the decision maker stepping in and achieving outcome V is the sum of the probability 
that the decision maker is competent (and thus steps in when the project is good, i.e. 
) and the probability that the decision maker is incompetent and stepped in with 
probability z (i.e. ). 
 
Consider now the posterior belief of the evaluator upon observing the decision maker 
stepping in ( ) and outcome 0. The evaluator's updated belief that the decision 
maker is competent is: 
 
 
 
The evaluator's updated belief is the probability that the decision maker is competent 
(the competent decision maker steps in on a good project and the outcome is 0 with 
probability  divided by the probability that the decision maker steps in and 
achieves outcome 0. The probability that the decision maker steps in and achieves 
outcome 0 is the sum of the probability that the decision maker is competent and steps 
                                                 
34 This simplifies to  
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in because the project is good but achieves outcome 0 (i.e. ), the probability 
that the decision maker is incompetent and stepped in on a good project but the 
outcome was 0 (i.e. ), and the probability that the decision maker is 
incompetent and steps in on a bad project achieving outcome 0 (i.e. 
). 
 
Consider now the posterior belief of the evaluator upon observing that the decision 
maker does not step in and the outcome is V. The evaluator's updated belief that the 
decision maker is competent is: 
 
 
 
The evaluator's updated belief is the probability that the decision maker is competent 
(the competent decision maker does not step in because the project bad and the 
private firm achieves V) divided by the probability that the decision maker does not 
step in and the outcome is V. The probability that the decision maker does not step in 
and the outcome is V is the sum of the probability that the decision maker is 
incompetent and the project is good with the private firm achieving V (i.e. 
), the probability that the decision maker is competent and the 
project is bad with the private firm giving outcome V (i.e. ), and the 
probability that the decision maker is incompetent and the project is bad with the 
private firm producing V (i.e. ). 
 
Consider now the posterior belief of the evaluator upon observing decision maker 
does not step in and the outcome is 0. The evaluator's updated belief that the decision 
maker is competent is: 
 
 
 
The evaluator's belief is the probability that the decision maker is competent (which 
in this case implies that the competent decision maker does not step in because the 
project is bad) divided by the probability that the decision maker does not step in and 
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the outcome is 0. The probability that the decision maker does not step in and the 
outcome is 0 is the sum of the probability that the decision maker is incompetent and 
the project is good with private firm producing outcome 0 (i.e. 
), the probability that the decision maker is competent and 
the project is bad with the private firm producing outcome 0 (i.e. ), 
and the probability that the decision maker is incompetent and the project is bad with 
the private firm producing outcome 0 (i.e. ). 
 
The decision maker then calculates the expected reputational gain he receives from 
stepping in or choosing to renew the private firm's contract. The expected reputational 
gain of the decision maker will depend on the type of the decision maker and on the 
quality of the project. 
 
3.5.2 Equilibrium 
 
Given that the incompetent type (L) does not observe the type of the project (θ) during 
period 1 and that the competent type (H) does, we can calculate the expected value of 
stepping in ( ) and of allowing the private firm to continue ( ) for the 
decision maker. 
 
I begin by showing that with reputational concerns, the competent decision maker 
always steps in if the project is good and does not step in if the project is bad. The 
competent decision maker (H) gets to know the type of the project during period 1. If 
the project is good ( ), then the expected reputational benefit of stepping in is 
always greater than the expected benefit of not stepping in, i.e.35 
 
 (2) 
 
If the project is bad ( ), then the expected reputational benefit of not stepping in 
is always greater than the expected benefit of stepping in, i.e.36 
 
 (3) 
                                                 
35 See appendix for proof with comparative statics.   
36 See appendix for proof with comparative statics.   
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Therefore if the project is good, the competent decision maker always steps in. If the 
project is bad, the competent decision maker continues with the private firm. 
 
Consider now the incompetent decision maker. Given that he does not observe the 
type of the project, his expected payoff when he steps in is given by 
 
 
 
If instead the incompetent decision maker does not step in, his expected payoff is 
 
 
 
I know show that there is no pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the 
incompetent decision maker chooses either to always step in or never to step in. To 
see this, suppose by contradiction that the incompetent decision maker (L) chooses to 
step in ( ) with probability 1, i.e. . Using Bayes' rule and the evaluator's 
updated beliefs we can calculate the expected reputational payoff to the incompetent 
decision maker from stepping in and from not stepping in. This implies  
and . Therefore the incompetent decision maker (L) obtains 
 
 
 
 
As the expected payoff from stepping in is less than 1, i.e.  
, the incompetent decision maker (L) has 
incentives to deviate and choose . Since by deviating and choosing not to step 
in, the incompetent decision maker receives a payoff of 1. Therefore it cannot be that 
the incompetent decision maker chooses to step in with probability 1. 
 
Alternatively, suppose by contradiction that the incompetent decision maker (L) 
chooses not to step in ( ), i.e. . Using Bayes' rule and the evaluator's 
updated beliefs we can calculate the expected reputational payoff to the incompetent 
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decision maker from stepping in and from not stepping in. This implies  
and . Therefore the incompetent decision maker (L) obtains 
 
 
 
 
As the expected payoff from not intervening in this case is less than 1, i.e. 
 , the incompetent decision 
maker (L) has incentives to deviate and choose to step in ( ). Since by deviating, 
the incompetent decision maker receives a payoff of 1. Therefore it cannot be that the 
incompetent decision maker chooses not to step in with probability 1. 
 
The following lemma summarizes the result. 
 
Lemma. There is no equilibrium where the incompetent decision maker (L) chooses 
either to always step in or never to step in.  
 
From the above lemma it follows that in equilibrium L must strictly randomize 
between stepping in ( ) and not stepping in ( ). I now derive the value of z 
where the incompetent decision maker is indifferent between stepping in and not. 
 
I have shown that at , the payoff of the incompetent decision maker from not 
stepping in is strictly greater than the payoff from stepping in. And that at , the 
payoff of the  incompetent decision from stepping in is strictly greater than the payoff 
from not stepping.  
 
Now note that the payoff of the incompetent decision maker from stepping in, given 
by  
 
, 
 
decreases in z, whilst the payoff from not stepping in is independent of z.  
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This means there must be a value of z between  and  where the incompetent 
decision maker will be indifferent between stepping in and not stepping in. At the 
equilibrium, the incompetent type (L) uses mixed strategies, implying that the 
expected reputational payoff from stepping in is equal to the expected reputational 
payoff from not stepping in for the incompetent type, i.e. 
 
 
(4) 
 
The comparative statics in the appendix can now helps us to show that the competent 
decision maker strictly prefers to step in if the project is good and not to step in if the 
project is bad.37 
 
This leads us to the following proposition; 
 
Proposition 1: There is an equilibrium where: (i) the competent decision maker H 
chooses to step in ( ) if the project is good ( ), and chooses not to step in 
( ) if the project is bad ( ). (ii) In this equilibrium the incompetent decision 
maker L uses mixed strategies, i.e. the incompetent decision maker will choose to step 
in ( ) with probability z. 
 
In equilibrium, the value of z depends on the values of the other parameters in the 
model. With reputational concerns the behaviour of the competent decision maker 
remains the same, i.e. he makes the most efficient decision by stepping in when the 
project is good and by not stepping in when the project is bad. Reputational concerns, 
however, distort the behaviour of the incompetent decision maker. 
 
Comparing the outcome of the equilibrium when the decision maker has reputational 
concerns with the case analyzed in section 3.4.2 where the decision maker does not 
have reputational concern. 
 
                                                 
37 See appendix for comparative statics. 
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Corollary. Reputational concerns create incentives that cause excessive intervention. 
This is because reputational concerns result in the incompetent decision maker 
stepping in more often than is optimal.  
 
In the first best the optimal strategy of the incompetent decision maker is not to step 
in. This first best is achieved when the decision maker does not have reputational 
concerns. But with reputational concerns the incompetent decision maker (L) now 
steps in with probability z. This means that reputational concerns cause an increased 
amount of stepping in. 
 
I now consider the impact of reputational concerns on the behaviour of the private 
firm. The fact that an incompetent decision maker can step in (because of reputational 
concerns) when a project is bad has a negative impact on the amount of firm specific 
investment the private firm chooses to make. With the decision maker having 
reputational concerns, if the project is bad, the private firm (F) maximises 
 
 
 
Therefore the private firm chooses a lower p, where 
 
 (5) 
 
This leads us to the following proposition; 
 
Proposition 2: When the competent decision maker chooses to step in ( ) if the 
project is good ( ) or not step in ( ) if the project is bad ( ), and the 
incompetent decision maker steps in ( ) with probability z, F will make less than 
the first best level of firm specific investment. The level of firm specific investment will 
be given where 
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Proposition 2 shows that there is under investment by the firm when the decision 
maker has reputational concerns compared to the case analyzed in section 3.4.2 where 
the decision maker does not have reputational concerns and the firm makes the 
optimal level of investment.  
 
With reputational concerns there is underinvestment because the reputational 
concerns of the decision maker lead the incompetent decision maker to step in too 
often. The firm anticipates that it will not be able to fully appropriate its investment 
and will therefore under-invest. In fact, we note that   is 
lower than , the level under first best. 
 
This finding is consistent with the empirical findings on regulatory risk. I show that 
increased regulatory risk leads to under-investment in quality improving firm specific 
investment in procurement contracts. The empirical findings from the literature on 
regulatory risk also show that regulatory risk results in lower than optimal 
performance by firms, for example firms are shown to delay investment decisions in 
the U.S. electricity industry (Ishii and Yan, 2004). Regulatory risk is generally found 
to lead to lower performance in regulated industries (Pescetto, 2008; and Buckland 
and Fraser, 2001). 
 
3.5.3 Description of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium 
 
In this section I consider an example to show that an equilibrium described in the 
previous section exists and I make some comparative statics analysis.  
 
I propose an equilibrium where the incompetent uses mixed strategy. That is, the 
equilibrium strategy of the incompetent decision maker is to step in with probability z. 
I use simulations to show the parameter values where z has a positive value and 
therefore the equilibrium exists. We also use simulations to show how the probability 
of stepping in, z, is related to the other parameters in the model. 
 
In equilibrium I have; 
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with the left hand side  and the right hand 
side . The equilibrium 
value of z is given where the LHS and the RHS intercept. We have an equilibrium if 
the interception yields a value of z between 0 and 1, i.e. if . 
 
I begin by analysing how the z varies with the probability that a project is good, g. I 
give the following values to the parameters; . 
The graph on the left shows the LHS of the equilibrium equation. In the graph g takes 
values . The graph rotates upwards as g increases in value. The 
graph on the right shows the RHS of the equilibrium equation. The parameters 
 take the same values as they do in the LHS. In the RHS, g takes the 
values . The RHS graph rotates and shifts to the right 
(downwards) as g increases in value. These results show that the probability of 
stepping in of the incompetent decision maker, z, increases with the proportion of 
good projects, g. This makes intuitive sense as a decision maker prefers stepping in 
when the project is good. A decision maker maximises his expected reputation by 
stepping in when the project is good. Therefore the incompetent decision maker (L) is 
more likely to step in as the probability that the project is good (g) increases. 
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here.] 
 
I now investigate how z varies with the probability that the decision maker is 
competent, . I give the following values to the parameters; 
. In the graph on the left (which shows the 
LHS of the equilibrium equation),  takes the values . As  
increases, the graph rotates upwards. The graph on the right shows the RHS of the 
equilibrium equation with the parameters having the same values as they do in the 
LHS. In the RHS,  has the values; . The RHS graph rotates 
upwards to the left as  increases in value. This shows an ambiguous relationship 
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between z and . As  increases, the reputational gain from stepping in increases, and 
the reputational gain from contract renewal increases as well. 
 
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here.] 
 
I now investigate how z is related to r and s. I focus on the LHS when investigating 
how z varies with r. The RHS does not vary with r. For this example, the parameters 
take values . In the diagram, r takes the values 
. The graph shows that with increasing values of r, the graph shifts 
and rotates to the left. Given that the RHS does not vary with r, this means that z is 
negatively related to r. This relationship is explained as follows. The incompetent 
decision maker's expected reputational gain from stepping in is 
 
 
 
Whilst the incompetent decision maker's expected reputational gain from not stepping 
in is 
 
 
 
As r increases and approaches 1, the incompetent decision maker's expected 
reputational benefit of stepping in decreases. When , the expected benefit of 
stepping in decreases to  (because  when ). However, the expected 
reputational benefit of not stepping in remains the same. Therefore as r increases, the 
incompetent decision maker increasingly prefers not to step in (i.e. z decreases) 
because the incompetent decision maker has a higher expected reputational benefit 
from not stepping in. 
 
[Insert Figures 5 and 6 here.] 
 
I finally focus on the RHS when investigating how z varies with s. The LHS does not 
vary with s. In this example, the parameters take values 
. In the diagram, s takes the values 
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. The graph shows that with increasing values of s, the graph shifts to 
the left. Given that the LHS does not vary with s, this means that z is negatively 
related to s. This is because as s increases, the reputational value of not stepping in 
also increases, thus reducing the likelihood of an incompetent decision maker 
stepping in (i.e. z decreases). This is shown as follows. The incompetent decision 
maker's expected reputational gain from not stepping in is 
 
 
 
The incompetent decision maker's expected reputational gain from stepping in is 
 
 
 
As s increases and approaches 1, the incompetent decision maker's expected 
reputational benefit of not stepping in increases. When , the expected benefit of 
not stepping in increases. This is because as s increases is  is increasing whereas  
is decreasing. At , . Figure 8 shows that as s increases, the expected 
benefits of stepping in curve shifts to the left. This implies that the increase in  is 
larger than the decrease in  as s increases. The expected reputational benefit from 
stepping in does not change with s. Therefore as s increases, the incompetent decision 
maker's expected reputational benefit increases thus the incompetent decision maker 
increasingly prefers not to step in (i.e. z decreases). 
 
[Insert Figures 7 and 8 here.] 
 
In summary, I use simulations to show two important results. Firstly I show that for 
some parameter values, the LHS and RHS intercept to give values of z between 0 and 
1. This shows that the mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Secondly, I show that the 
probability of stepping in of the incompetent decision maker, z, increases with the 
proportion of good projects, g. This makes intuitive sense as it is more reputationally 
beneficial for a decision maker to step in when the project is good, therefore as g 
increases, the more likely L will step in. The probability that the decision maker is 
competent, , is ambiguously related to z. As  increases, the reputational gain from 
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stepping in increases, and the reputational gain from not stepping in increases as well. 
I also show that z is negatively related to r and s. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows that the reputational concerns of the government cause 
governments to excessively intervene in procurement projects. Thus, reputational 
concerns increase regulatory risk. I also show how reputational concerns have can 
have an impact on players in different hierarchies of organisations and in contractual 
relationships. When a principal has reputational concerns and is potentially 
incompetent, I show in our set up that having the option of stepping in can result in 
less than desired effort being undertaken by the private firm in improving the quality 
of the project.  
 
The predictions of this theoretical model are consistent with the empirical findings 
from research that investigates the impact of regulatory risk on firm performance and 
asset valuation. This research shows that regulatory risk negatively affects land value 
(Riddiogough, 1995) and delivery of electricity (Ishii and Yan, 2004). Regulatory risk 
is also shown to increase share volatility (Robinson and Taylor, 1998) and increase a 
firm’s systematic risk (Buckland and Fraser, 2001). The findings of this chapter 
suggest that avoiding the possibility of government intervention is a means of 
overcoming the under-investment problem. 
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Chapter 4 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I first summarize the findings from the previous three chapters. I then 
provide some concluding remarks and policy implications.  
 
4.1 Summary of the Thesis’ Findings 
 
The introductory chapter raised the important question of whether public service 
motivation and reputational concerns can improve quality in the provision of public 
goods and services. This is particularly important because the public sector provides 
unique challenges that traditional incentives may be unable to correct. This thesis has 
given empirical evidence that supports the view that by hiring individuals that are 
public service motivated, the public sector will improve performance. This thesis has 
also shown that reputational concerns can result in lower provision of quality 
improving effort.  
 
4.1.1 Chapter 1: Crowding Out Public Service Motivation 
 
Chapter 1 started by explaining public service motivation and proposing that hiring 
individuals that are public service motivated can improve performance and quality in 
the public sector.  
 
I argued that the concept of PSM had its roots in the public administration literature 
and that satisfactory empirical evidence of PSM was lacking. Several studies have 
attempted to identify PSM these studies have failed to take a comparative perspective 
of worker motivation between the public and private sectors (e.g. Brewer and Seldon, 
1998). The studies also showed that individuals in the public sector derive higher 
levels of satisfaction from the intrinsic aspects of work than their counterparts in the 
private sector (e.g. Crewson, 1997; Dilulio, 1994; and Houston, 2000, 2006). 
However, these studies have did not identify whether it was the public sector that 
caused individuals to derive higher levels of intrinsic satisfaction from public sector 
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work or whether it was intrinsically individuals that were attracted to the public sector 
that caused the higher intrinsic satisfaction in the public sector.  
 
I also investigated whether high intrinsic rewards in the public sector deterred public 
service motivated individuals from joining the public sector. The reason why this may 
be the case is that if intrinsically motivated individuals also care about their reputation 
for being intrinsically motivated (altruistic), then higher extrinsic rewards may reduce 
the overall utility of moving to the public sector because higher extrinsic rewards 
reduce the individual’s reputation for being pro-social when the individual moves to 
the public sector. That is, higher extrinsic rewards have an image spoiling effect.  
 
I used data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to determine whether 
individuals that derived higher utility from the intrinsic characteristics of work in the 
public sector (i.e. public service motivated individuals) were more likely to move to 
the public sector. I also examine whether higher extrinsic rewards in the public sector 
deter individuals from joining the public sector. Using real wage, satisfaction with the 
work itself (as a proxy for utility derived from the intrinsic aspects of work), 
satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with job security, and satisfaction with the hours 
worked (as proxies for utility derived from the extrinsic aspects of work). I estimate 
Mincer-type earnings and satisfaction functions corrected for selectivity bias for both 
men and women. I use the estimates to calculate the expected earnings and 
satisfaction differentials between the private and public sector. I then use these 
differentials in probit estimation to determine how these differentials influence the 
probability of moving from the private to the public sector. 
 
The main findings show that individuals are more likely to move to the public sector 
if they expect to enjoy greater satisfaction with the work itself in the public sector. 
This is strong evidence that individuals move to the public sector because they are 
public service motivated. Furthermore, higher predicted satisfaction with extrinsic 
rewards in the public sector reduces the probability of moving to the public sector. 
This result provides strong evidence of the image spoiling effect of extrinsic rewards 
in the public sector.  
 
 86 
 
These findings suggest that the public sector should lower wages and other extrinsic 
rewards. Firstly, because higher extrinsic rewards in the public sector deter public 
service motivated individuals from entering the public sector. Lower extrinsic rewards 
allow for better matching as individuals with PSM are more willing to work in the 
public sector. Secondly, a reduction in extrinsic rewards reduces problems caused by 
adverse selection as extrinsically motivated individuals are less likely to apply for 
public sector jobs.  
 
4.1.2 Chapter 2: Does Public Service Motivation Adapt? 
 
In Chapter 2 I investigated the temporal stability of public service motivation. That is, 
I investigated whether intrinsic motivation in the public sector adapted back down 
towards a baseline level. This study is important because if PSM is to be beneficial to 
the public sector as is argued in the literature; then individuals must remain 
intrinsically motivated in the public sector in the long term.  
 
I used data from the BHPS to determine the temporal nature of PSM. The panel 
nature of the data allows this researcher to observe individuals before and after they 
change jobs. I examine how overall job satisfaction and its domains vary before and 
after a change in job from the private to the public sector using fixed effects panel 
regression. Satisfaction with the work itself is the proxy for utility derived from the 
intrinsic aspects of the job. To gain a comparative perspective, I also examine how 
overall job satisfaction and its domains vary before and after job changes from the 
private to the public sector, job changes within the public sector, and job changes 
within the private sector.  
 
The main findings show that PSM does not adapt for both men and women, even in 
the long term. That is, when individuals change jobs from the private to the public 
sector, there is a permanent increase in overall job satisfaction and this increase is 
associated with a permanent increase in satisfaction with the work itself. Job changes 
from the public to the private sector, job changes within the public sector, and job 
changes within the public sector do not result in a permanent increase in overall job 
satisfaction or its domains. The exception is for men who move from the public to the 
private sector. They experience a permanent increase in overall job satisfaction. 
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However, this increase is associated with a permanent increase in satisfaction from 
the extrinsic aspects of work.  
 
These findings show that both men and women who accept public sector employment 
have a boost in satisfaction with the intrinsic aspects of work. I also show that this 
increase is permanent. This provides strong evidence that PSM does not adapt. This 
suggests that the public sector can gain in the long term from employing individuals 
with PSM.  
 
4.1.3 Chapter 3: Reputation and Under-investment 
 
In chapter 3, I investigate the impact of reputational concerns on procurement 
contracts. I analyse how reputational concerns impact the decision making behaviour 
of a government and how this then impacts on the performance of private firms in 
procurement contracts. I argue that instead of creating positive incentives (that can 
result in cost reduction and/or quality improvement), possible intervention by the 
government (where this decision affects the government’s image) can in fact result in 
contracted firms having reduced incentives to improve quality. This is because 
reputational concerns cause the government to intervene more often than is optimal. 
This increases the likelihood of the private firm experiencing expropriation.  
 
This chapter shows how reputational concerns can have an impact on players in 
different hierarchies of organisations and contractual relationships. This chapter 
suggests that avoiding the possibility of government intervention is a means of 
overcoming the under-investment problem.  
 
4.2 Prospects for Future Research 
 
The research undertaken in this thesis leads to several prospects for future research. In 
this section I will discuss topics that are of interest for future research. This discussion 
will include the data and methodologies that can be used to investigate these prospects 
for future research.  
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The first prospect for future research is to investigate how intrinsic motivation in the 
workplace is affected by life events. This is of interest because life events, such as 
marriage and having children, have been shown to have a significant impact on life 
satisfaction (Clark et al., 2008; Frey and Stutzer, 2006). The effects are significant 
both in the years leading up to the event and in the years after the event. If there is no 
segmentation of individual’s life well-being and well-being at work then life events 
can affect well being at work. Researchers in sociology and psychology argue that if 
there is no segmentation, life events can impact well-being at work in two ways; spill-
over or compensation. Spill-over is where the attitudes and behaviours that are 
developed in the life domain are carried into the work domain. Compensation is 
where individuals that do not receive satisfaction in one domain will attempt to 
achieve satisfaction in another domain by increasing involvement in the more 
satisfying domain. Life events can thus have an important impact on well-being at 
work. Of interest will be to determine whether life events impact intrinsic motivation 
at work and to determine whether some employment sectors (such as the public 
sector) are better at maintaining intrinsic motivation when different life events occur.  
 
This can be investigated using data from the BHPS. The panel nature of BHPS data 
allows for identification of individuals over time. This means individual and work 
characteristics are observable over time. This means that the BHPS can be used to 
investigate how life events, such as marriage, can affect well-being and intrinsic 
motivation at work. The methodology can be similar to that used in Chapter 2, where 
lead and lag dummies for the years leading up to and after the life event are 
constructed and used as key explanatory variables in a fixed effects panel regression. 
The independent variable will be the various domains of job satisfaction. Overall job 
satisfaction will proxy overall utility from work. Satisfaction with the work itself will 
proxy satisfaction from the intrinsic aspects of work. Satisfaction with pay, job 
security, and working hours will proxy utility from extrinsic rewards. The regressions 
will control for various individual and work characteristics.  
 
A second prospect for future research would be an investigation into how political 
affiliation can affect well-being at work and intrinsic motivation in the public sector. 
The study will determine whether or not an individual’s political preference affects 
public service motivation. If the political party running the government is not that 
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which an individual prefers, this study will attempt to find out if this negatively 
affects intrinsic motivation in the public sector.  
 
This can be tested using the BHPS. In addition to many individual and work 
characteristics, the BHPS also contains information on individuals’ political party 
affiliation. To test the hypothesis that political affiliation affects work well being and 
intrinsic motivation at work, a dummy variable representing the political party 
individuals’ support can be a key explanatory variable in panel fixed effects 
regression that has also controls for various individual and work characteristics. The 
independent variable will vary across the job satisfaction and its domains. Job 
satisfaction will proxy overall utility from work. Satisfaction with the work itself will 
proxy satisfaction from the intrinsic aspects of work. Satisfaction with pay, job 
security, and working hours will proxy utility from extrinsic rewards. The analysis 
will focus on public sector workers.  
 
Third, research from this thesis indicates that investigating the determinants of PSM 
in individuals. The literature from public administration argues that PSM is the result 
of parental modelling or socialisation within organisations. This proposition can be 
tested using data from the BHPS. The BHPS contains data on religious affiliation and 
parent’s occupation. These can be used to test the hypothesis that parental modelling 
and socialisation from organisations are significant determinants of intrinsic 
motivation and PSM. This can be tested using a pooled ordered probit regression with 
satisfaction from the work itself as the dependent variable and parent’s occupation 
and religious affiliation as key explanatory variables. From these regressions we 
should be able to determine whether parental modelling and socialising from 
organisations are associated with intrinsic motivation.  
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis also indicates that investigating the impact of reputational 
concerns in deterring intrinsically motivated individuals from joining the public sector 
or undertaking pro-social actions. To test the hypothesis that reputational concerns 
influence pro-social behaviour or the decision to join the public sector, personality 
measures that can proxy the value an individual places on their reputation are 
necessary. If a dataset can be found that contains such proxies and similar variables to 
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those analysed in Chapter 1 then the impact reputational concerns on pro-social 
behaviour can be analysed.   
 
The BHPS also contains information on individuals working in for non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), such as charities. Another future prospect for research will be 
to investigate whether individuals that move to the NGO sector have sustained 
increases in utility derived from the intrinsic aspects of working for NGOs. It will also 
be interesting to investigate whether high extrinsic rewards also deter intrinsically 
motivated individuals from joining the NGO sector, as they do when such individuals 
wish to join the public sector. Using the BHPS, individuals that make the transition 
from the non-NGO sectors (both private and public) to the NGO sector can be 
identified. Similar methodology to that used in Chapters 1 and 2 can be used to carry 
out the analysis.    
 
This thesis also indicates that it would also be very interesting to investigate whether 
intrinsic motivation and PSM varies across different countries. This can be 
investigated using data from the World Values Survey (WSV). This can be 
investigated firstly by comparing the mean level of satisfaction from the intrinsic 
aspects of work from both the private and public sector of each country. Secondly, 
this can be investigated by estimating country intrinsic satisfaction equations that 
include a public sector employment dummy (to identify individuals that work in the 
public sector). The dummy coefficients for different countries can be compared across 
countries to determine which countries have higher intrinsic motivation in the public 
sector.  
 
It would also be interesting to run an experiment to test the propositions in Chapter 3. 
This means running an experiment that tests two things; firstly, whether the 
competence of a decision maker will affect the probability of intervention by a 
decision maker will affect the probability of intervention by a decision maker. 
Secondly, the experimental study will test whether the increased probability of 
intervention will affect the performance of a party that is undertaking a task for the 
decision maker.  
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Another interesting idea will be use the theoretical model given to investigate how 
reputational concerns affect the behaviour of a decision maker if the decision maker 
undertakes provision of the project in period 1. In this case the decision maker is 
faced with the decision to continue in house provision or let a private firm takeover 
provision of the project in the second period. This will be interesting because it will 
allow investigation of how reputational concerns affect the decision to outsource or 
privatise. Thus determining whether reputational concerns can lead to more 
outsourcing or privatisation than is optimal. The propositions from the theoretical 
model can be tested using an experiment.  
  
The above are prospective areas for future research that lead on from this thesis. They 
will make key contributions to the economic literature on intrinsic motivation and 
reputational concerns.      
 
4.3 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
 
This thesis finds strong evidence of PSM and shows that individuals remain 
intrinsically motivated in the public sector even in the long term. Therefore, this thesis 
suggests that governments should actively recruit individuals with PSM as this will 
increase efficiency and performance in the public sector without a greater need for 
high powered incentives to achieve such improvements (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). In 
fact, this thesis shows if the public sector has extrinsic rewards that are too high, this 
may deter individuals with PSM from joining the public sector.  
 
This thesis also shows that the reputational concerns of the government can have a 
detrimental effect on the performance of private contractors in procurement contracts, 
if these reputational concerns lead to a higher than optimal likelihood of government 
intervention.  
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1 
 
Table 1 
The Distribution of Job Satisfaction Measures 
 
MALES 
 
 
Rank 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The Work 
Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Count % Count  % Count % Count % Count % 
1 684 1.92 685 1.92 1,705 4.79 1,463 4.12 977 2.74 
2 1,150 3.23 995 2.79 2,037 5.72 1,290 3.63 1,328 3.73 
3 2,837 7.97 2,377 6.68 5,413 15.20 2,871 8.08 3,973 11.16 
4 3,511 9.86 3,318 9.32 3,528 9.91 3,639 10.24 4,724 13.27 
5 8,502 23.88 7,588 21.31 8,979 25.22 6,746 18.98 8,003 22.47 
6 15,223 42.76 14,614 41.05 11,374 31.95 12,365 34.79 12,282 34.49 
7 3,693 10.37 6,027 16.93 2,568 7.21 7,166 20.16 4,324 12.14 
Total 35,600 100.00 35,604 100.00 35,604 100.00 35,540 100.00 35,611 100.00 
 
FEMALES 
 
 
Rank 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The Work 
Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Count % Count  % Count % Count % Count % 
1 444 1.75 449 1.77 1,168 4.60 868 3.42 542 2.13 
2 708 2.79 673 2.65 1,477 5.82 655 2.58 785 3.09 
3 1,691 6.66 1,608 6.33 3,791 14.93 1,700 6.70 2,930 11.53 
4 1,642 6.47 1,712 6.74 2,023 7.97 1,828 7.21 2,369 9.32 
5 5,566 21.92 5,206 20.49 6,198 24.41 4,308 16.99 5,718 22.51 
6 11,803 46.48 10,819 42.58 8,390 33.04 9,478 37.38 9,284 36.54 
7 3,542 13.95 4,939 19.44 2,348 9.25 6,519 25.71 3,777 14.87 
Total 25,396 100.00 25,406 100.00 25,395 100.00 25,356 100.00 25,405 100.00 
 
Table 2 
 Number of observations of Transitions 
 Observations 
 Males Females 
   
Entry into Public Sector from Private 
Sector 
336 411 
Entry into Caring Public Sector from 
Private Sector 
59 185 
Entry into Non Caring Public Sector from 
Private Sector 
162 95 
Entry into Private Sector from Public 
Sector 
349 310 
Entry into Caring Private Sector from 
Public Sector 
24 86 
Entry into Non Caring Private Sector 
from Public Sector 
241 135 
   
Note: Not all individuals that make the transition from the public to the private sector and from the private sector 
to the public sector provide information on their occupations which I use to identify caring and non caring jobs. 
This is why lines 2 and 3 do not add up to line 1, and lines 5 and 6 do not add up to line 4.     
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Table 3 
Gender and Sector Means for Real Wage, Hours Worked and Job Tenure 
 Means T-stat on Sector 
Difference 
 Public Private  
    
Real Wage (£/month)    
Men  1848 1688 10.69*** 
Women 1494 1131 34.19*** 
    
Hours Worked (weekly)    
Men 38.72 40.68 -22.02*** 
Women 35.83 37.09 -17.79*** 
    
Job Tenure (years)    
Men 6.42 4.56 21.25*** 
Women 4.99 3.45 22.02*** 
    
 
Table 4 
Probit results for transition into Public and Private Sectors  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
ityˆ  -1.437* (0.832) -1.185** (0.571) 0.239 (1.010) 1.738** (0.747) 
)(ˆ PAYits  -0.474 (0.354) -0.024 (0.183) -0.661 (0.411) 0.043 (0.227) 
)(ˆ SECits  -0.223 (0.238) 0.312* (0.163) 0.677** (0.288) 0.475** (0.230) 
)(ˆ WORKits  0.591*** (0.221) 0.818** (0.320) -0.001 (0.248) -0.413 (0.447) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -0.727** (0.317) -0.606*** (0.236) 0.287 (0.347) 0.846*** (0.328) 
Employer offers Pension (t) 0.265* (0.150) 0.250 (0.175) 0.367** (0.172) -0.093 (0.224) 
Age (t-1) 0.003 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) -0.007 (0.005) -0.008 (0.006) 
Pension (t-1) -0.221*** (0.059) -0.267*** (0.061) -0.337*** (0.078) -0.310*** (0.076) 
Trade Union Member (t-1) -0.072 (0.075) 0.258*** (0.077) 0.136* (0.082) 0.263*** (0.082) 
Married (t-1) -0.269*** (0.087) -0.230*** (0.086) -0.051 (0.100) -0.145 (0.108) 
Living as Couple (t-1) -0.167* (0.088) -0.182** (0.081) -0.159 (0.109) 0.049 (0.100) 
Widowed (t-1) 0.025 (0.427) -0.394 (0.332) 0.196 (0.528) -0.451 (0.331) 
Divorced (t-1) 0.093 (0.172) -0.117 (0.128) 0.057 (0.187) -0.073 (0.148) 
Higher Level Edu (t-1) 0.043 (0.078) 0.256** (0.116) -0.032 (0.100) -0.198 (0.155) 
Medium Level Edu (t-1) 0.103 (0.076) 0.143 (0.098) -0.034 (0.101) -0.091 (0.125) 
Health Problems (t-1) -0.012 (0.050) 0.144*** (0.053) -0.039 (0.060) 0.192*** (0.064) 
No. of Children (t-1)  0.087*** (0.033) 0.066* (0.036) 0.023 (0.040) 0.026 (0.041) 
Renter (t-1) 0.116 (0.073) 0.244*** (0.090) 0.164* (0.097) 0.045 (0.125) 
Medium Firm (t-1) -0.047 (0.068) -0.084 (0.067) 0.160* (0.094) 0.187** (0.093) 
Large Firm (t-1)  -0.111 (0.075) -0.276*** (0.078) 0.291*** (0.095) 0.193* (0.099) 
Regional Dummies (t-1) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -2.956*** (0.695) -3.739*** (0.420) -1.972** (0.826) -2.189*** (0.595) 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.105 0.084 0.115 
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. Note on differential*****. 
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Table 5 
Probit results for Transition – Caring and Non Caring Jobs (Men and Women) 
 Public 
 Caring Non Caring 
   
ityˆ  -0.033 (0.985) 0.372 (0.844) 
)(ˆ PAYits  -0.517** (0.251) -0.668*** (0.229) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.309 (0.227) 0.328 (0.204) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.166*** (0.389) 1.347*** (0.366) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -1.047*** (0.359) -1.020*** (0.320) 
   
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
 
Table 6 
Probit results for Transition – Government Sub-sectors (Men And Women) 
 Central Government Local Government NHS And Higher Education 
    
ityˆ  -0.158 (1.115) -0.637 (0.917) -0.634 (0.978) 
)(ˆ PAYits  -0.447 (0.301) 0.380 (0.243) -0.892*** (0.246) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.374 (0.266) -0.216 (0.220) 0.261 (0.221) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.463*** (0.485) 1.402*** (0.371) 0.745* (0.384) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -0.788* (0.413) -0.891*** (0.342) -1.260*** (0.356) 
    
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
 
Table 7 
Probit results for Transition into Public Sector– Income (Men and Women) 
 Lowest 25th Percentile  
(<£910.00/month) 
Highest 25th Percentile  
(>£1833.33/month) 
   
ityˆ  -1.428 (1.237) 0.668 (1.353) 
)(ˆ PAYits  -0.655** (0.325) -0.397 (0.368) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.703** (0.308) 0.187 (0.323) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.304** (0.530) 0.967
^ (0.592) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -1.084** (0.489) -0.604 (0.489) 
   
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. ^ indicates significance at a 10.2% confidence level. 
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Table A1 
Log Wage Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age 0.005*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member -0.173 (0.127) 0.337*** (0.041) 0.069*** (0.025) 0.040 (0.037) 
Employer Offers Pension  -0.058 (0.050) 0.139*** (0.028) 0.176*** (0.007) 0.258*** (0.012) 
Married 0.216*** (0.026) -0.041*** (0.013) 0.207*** (0.009) 0.049*** (0.010) 
Living as Couple 0.151*** (0.029) -0.021 (0.016) 0.170*** (0.009) 0.086*** (0.011) 
Widowed 0.124 (0.094) -0.041 (0.036) 0.107*** (0.039) -0.104*** (0.035) 
Divorced 0.120*** (0.030) -0.025 (0.019) 0.185*** (0.017) 0.086*** (0.017) 
Higher Level Education 0.254*** (0.075) 0.679*** (0.036) 0.367*** (0.011) 0.429*** (0.021) 
Medium Level Education 0.083** (0.041) 0.280*** (0.023) 0.138*** (0.008) 0.189*** (0.012) 
Health Problems -0.018* (0.011) -0.007 (0.009) -0.031*** (0.005) -0.042*** (0.007) 
No. of Children 0.054*** (0.007) 0.028*** (0.007) 0.058*** (0.003) -0.009* (0.006) 
Renter -0.215*** (0.021) -0.202*** (0.018) -0.229*** (0.008) -0.209*** (0.011) 
Medium Firm -0.013 (0.031) 0.063*** (0.019) 0.089*** (0.007) 0.091*** (0.009) 
Large Firm 0.031 (0.035) 0.091*** (0.013) 0.167*** (0.008) 0.170*** (0.010) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.805*** (0.417) 1.254*** (0.145) 1.903*** (0.016) 1.669*** (0.024) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.992*** (0.019) 1.150*** (0.021) -0.969*** (0.019) -1.144*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.320*** (0.023) 0.531*** (0.024) -0.218*** (0.022) -0.480*** (0.024) 
Married -0.167*** (0.028) -0.065** (0.028) 0.152*** (0.027) 0.073*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.169*** (0.031) -0.157*** (0.031) 0.158*** (0.031) 0.153*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.374*** (0.131) 0.205** (0.084) 0.359*** (0.127) -0.171** (0.083) 
Divorced 0.076 (0.049) -0.052 (0.043) -0.072 (0.048) 0.065 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.578*** (0.025) 0.933*** (0.029) -0.439*** (0.024) -0.851*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.428*** (0.029) -0.151*** (0.026) -0.346*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.042** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.032*** (0.010) 0.126*** (0.012) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.048 (0.030) -0.146*** (0.033) 0.071** (0.030) 0.173*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.211*** (0.023) 0.125*** (0.024) -0.232*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.245*** (0.024) 0.189*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.197*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.106*** (0.054) -2.472*** (0.062) 1.877*** (0.054) 2.308*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.382** (0.174) 0.261*** (0.059) -0.225*** (0.057) -0.102* (0.053) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A2 
Satisfaction with Work Itself Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age -0.003 (0.006) -0.005* (0.003) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.002) 
Trade Union Member -1.336*** (0.430) -0.203 (0.131) -0.344*** (0.082) -0.461*** (0.118) 
Employer Offers Pension  -0.321* (0.170) -0.089 (0.089) 0.019 (0.021) -0.111*** (0.039) 
Married 0.049 (0.091) 0.272*** (0.039) 0.174*** (0.029) 0.095*** (0.034) 
Living as Couple -0.047 (0.100) 0.028 (0.049) 0.047 (0.029) 0.019 (0.036) 
Widowed 0.924*** (0.333) 0.476*** (0.100) 0.279** (0.125) 0.272** (0.113) 
Divorced -0.296*** (0.108) 0.129** (0.058) 0.230*** (0.053) -0.018 (0.053) 
Higher Level Education -0.609** (0.254) -0.205* (0.112) -0.083** (0.034) -0.194*** (0.069) 
Medium Level Education -0.377*** (0.142) -0.125* (0.071) -0.062*** (0.024) -0.083** (0.038) 
Health Problems -0.215*** (0.038) -0.157*** (0.026) -0.115*** (0.017) -0.119*** (0.023) 
No. of Children 0.003 (0.026) 0.045** (0.020) 0.020** (0.010) 0.047*** (0.018) 
Renter 0.121 (0.074) 0.086 (0.055) 0.019 (0.026) 0.087** (0.037) 
Medium Firm -0.277*** (0.107) -0.116*** (0.036) -0.226*** (0.023) -0.219*** (0.028) 
Large Firm -0.399*** (0.121) -0.202*** (0.040) -0.291*** (0.027) -0.385*** (0.033) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.059*** (1.412) 6.183*** (0.458) 5.356*** (0.052) 5.421*** (0.076) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.992*** (0.019) 1.150*** (0.021) -0.970*** (0.019) -1.144*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.322*** (0.023) 0.532*** (0.024) -0.217*** (0.022) -0.480*** (0.024) 
Married -0.167*** (0.028) -0.065** (0.028) 0.153*** (0.027) 0.073*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.169*** (0.031) -0.157*** (0.031) 0.158*** (0.031) 0.153*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.373*** (0.131) 0.205** (0.084) 0.361*** (0.127) -0.171** (0.083) 
Divorced 0.076 (0.049) -0.051 (0.043) -0.070 (0.048) 0.065 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.579*** (0.025) 0.933*** (0.029) -0.439*** (0.024) -0.851*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.428*** (0.029) -0.152*** (0.026) -0.346*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.043** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.031*** (0.010) 0.125*** (0.013) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.047 (0.030) -0.146*** (0.033) 0.071** (0.030) 0.173*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.211*** (0.023) 0.125*** (0.024) -0.233*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.246*** (0.024) 0.189*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.197*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.107*** (0.054) -2.472*** (0.062) 1.877*** (0.054) 2.308*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -1.677*** (0.587) -0.149 (0.189) 0.282 (0.186) 0.447*** (0.169) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A3 
Satisfaction with Pay Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age 0.013** (0.006) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.003** (0.001) 0.005** (0.002) 
Trade Union Member -0.267 (0.502) 0.337** (0.160) 0.045 (0.095) -0.306** (0.138) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.183 (0.197) 0.553*** (0.109) 0.297*** (0.025) 0.204*** (0.046) 
Married -0.048 (0.098) 0.093* (0.048) 0.112*** (0.033) 0.198*** (0.040) 
Living as Couple -0.044 (0.108) -0.048 (0.060) 0.011 (0.034) 0.092** (0.042) 
Widowed 0.595* (0.344) 0.176 (0.126) 0.122 (0.145) 0.160 (0.133) 
Divorced -0.166 (0.106) -0.380*** (0.073) 0.108* (0.061) -0.178*** (0.063) 
Higher Level Education 0.220 (0.293) 0.172 (0.138) 0.220*** (0.040) -0.014 (0.081) 
Medium Level Education 0.077 (0.161) -0.054 (0.087) 0.025 (0.028) 0.094** (0.044) 
Health Problems -0.167*** (0.038) -0.048 (0.033) -0.129*** (0.019) -0.197*** (0.027) 
No. of Children 0.042 (0.026) 0.126*** (0.025) 0.009 (0.011) 0.010 (0.021) 
Renter -0.281*** (0.077) -0.173** (0.068) -0.187*** (0.031) -0.077* (0.043) 
Medium Firm -0.129 (0.121) 0.111** (0.045) -0.094*** (0.027) -0.095*** (0.033) 
Large Firm -0.184 (0.136) -0.095* (0.050) 0.048 (0.031) 0.022 (0.039) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.614*** (1.647) 3.102*** (0.562) 4.663*** (0.060) 4.255*** (0.089) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.992*** (0.019) 1.149*** (0.021) -0.970*** (0.019) -1.144*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.320*** (0.023) 0.534*** (0.024) -0.216*** (0.022) -0.479*** (0.024) 
Married -0.167*** (0.028) -0.064** (0.028) 0.153*** (0.027) 0.073*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.169*** (0.031) -0.156*** (0.031) 0.159*** (0.031) 0.153*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.374*** (0.131) 0.207** (0.084) 0.361*** (0.127) -0.171** (0.083) 
Divorced 0.076 (0.049) -0.050 (0.043) -0.071 (0.048) 0.064 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.578*** (0.025) 0.935*** (0.029) -0.440*** (0.024) -0.851*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.429*** (0.029) -0.151*** (0.026) -0.346*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.042** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.032*** (0.010) 0.126*** (0.013) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.048 (0.030) -0.147*** (0.033) 0.071** (0.030) 0.173*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.211*** (0.023) 0.124*** (0.024) -0.233*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.245*** (0.024) 0.189*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.197*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.106*** (0.054) -2.477*** (0.062) 1.877*** (0.054) 2.308*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.329 (0.688) 0.626*** (0.231) -0.424** (0.215) 0.437** (0.199) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A4 
Satisfaction with Job Security Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age 0.005 (0.006) -0.002 (0.003) -0.013*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.002) 
Trade Union Member 0.065 (0.517) -0.063 (0.153) -0.533*** (0.094) -0.805*** (0.129) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.678*** (0.204) 0.548*** (0.104) 0.229*** (0.025) -0.001 (0.043) 
Married -0.128 (0.101) 0.148*** (0.045) 0.064* (0.033) 0.084** (0.037) 
Living as Couple 0.010 (0.111) 0.079 (0.057) 0.041 (0.034) 0.089** (0.040) 
Widowed 0.510 (0.351) -0.057 (0.118) -0.138 (0.144) 0.079 (0.127) 
Divorced -0.029 (0.109) -0.060 (0.068) 0.026 (0.061) -0.087 (0.059) 
Higher Level Education 0.204 (0.301) 0.123 (0.132) -0.291*** (0.039) -0.225*** (0.076) 
Medium Level Education 0.045 (0.165) 0.079 (0.083) -0.152*** (0.028) 0.013 (0.042) 
Health Problems -0.147*** (0.039) -0.098*** (0.031) -0.102*** (0.019) -0.118*** (0.025) 
No. of Children 0.065** (0.027) -0.024 (0.024) -0.022** (0.011) -0.036* (0.020) 
Renter -0.183** (0.079) -0.231*** (0.064) -0.017 (0.030) 0.123*** (0.041) 
Medium Firm 0.161 (0.124) -0.017 (0.042) -0.233*** (0.027) -0.241*** (0.031) 
Large Firm -0.082 (0.140) -0.048 (0.047) -0.311*** (0.031) -0.430*** (0.037) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.841*** (1.694) 5.500*** (0.535) 5.904*** (0.060) 5.914*** (0.085) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.993*** (0.019) 1.150*** (0.021) -0.969*** (0.019) -1.145*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.322*** (0.023) 0.533*** (0.024) -0.217*** (0.022) -0.479*** (0.024) 
Married -0.166*** (0.028) -0.064** (0.028) 0.152*** (0.027) 0.074*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.168*** (0.031) -0.157*** (0.031) 0.159*** (0.031) 0.153*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.371*** (0.131) 0.207** (0.084) 0.363*** (0.127) -0.176** (0.084) 
Divorced 0.078 (0.049) -0.049 (0.043) -0.071 (0.048) 0.065 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.578*** (0.025) 0.935*** (0.029) -0.439*** (0.024) -0.849*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.430*** (0.029) -0.150*** (0.026) -0.345*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.043** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.031*** (0.010) 0.125*** (0.013) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.049 (0.030) -0.146*** (0.033) 0.070** (0.030) 0.174*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.210*** (0.023) 0.123*** (0.024) -0.233*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.245*** (0.024) 0.188*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.198*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.104*** (0.054) -2.471*** (0.062) 1.878*** (0.054) 2.307*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.039 (0.708) -0.172 (0.221) 0.506** (0.213) 0.673*** (0.185) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
 
Table A5 
Satisfaction with Hours Worked Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age -0.006 (0.006) -0.016*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 
Trade Union Member -0.850* (0.461) -0.637*** (0.149) -0.057 (0.089) -0.296** (0.122) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.009 (0.182) -0.002 (0.101) 0.039* (0.023) -0.082** (0.041) 
Married -0.149 (0.092) 0.129*** (0.044) -0.062** (0.031) -0.110*** (0.035) 
Living as Couple -0.089 (0.101) 0.100* (0.056) -0.136*** (0.032) -0.049 (0.037) 
Widowed 0.876*** (0.323) 0.045 (0.116) 0.381*** (0.135) 0.196* (0.117) 
Divorced -0.060 (0.101) 0.035 (0.067) 0.003 (0.057) -0.257*** (0.055) 
Higher Level Education -0.454* (0.269) -0.961*** (0.128) -0.121*** (0.037) -0.310*** (0.071) 
Medium Level Education -0.211 (0.148) -0.346*** (0.080) -0.021 (0.026) -0.061 (0.039) 
Health Problems -0.126*** (0.036) -0.156*** (0.030) -0.101*** (0.018) -0.154*** (0.023) 
No. of Children -0.004 (0.025) -0.057** (0.023) -0.052*** (0.011) -0.012 (0.019) 
Renter 0.025 (0.072) 0.188*** (0.063) 0.011 (0.029) 0.080** (0.038) 
Medium Firm -0.148 (0.111) -0.106** (0.041) -0.070*** (0.025) -0.120*** (0.029) 
Large Firm -0.216* (0.126) -0.049 (0.046) -0.005 (0.029) -0.150*** (0.035) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 7.641*** (1.511) 7.477*** (0.521) 5.395*** (0.056) 5.544*** (0.079) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.992*** (0.019) 1.150*** (0.021) -0.970*** (0.019) -1.145*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.321*** (0.023) 0.532*** (0.024) -0.217*** (0.022) -0.480*** (0.024) 
Married -0.166*** (0.028) -0.065** (0.028) 0.152*** (0.027) 0.074*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.169*** (0.031) -0.157*** (0.031) 0.159*** (0.031) 0.152*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.373*** (0.131) 0.205** (0.084) 0.361*** (0.127) -0.170** (0.083) 
Divorced 0.076 (0.049) -0.051 (0.043) -0.070 (0.048) 0.065 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.578*** (0.025) 0.933*** (0.029) -0.439*** (0.024) -0.850*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.428*** (0.029) -0.151*** (0.026) -0.346*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.043** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.031*** (0.010) 0.126*** (0.013) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.048 (0.030) -0.146*** (0.033) 0.070** (0.030) 0.173*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.210*** (0.023) 0.125*** (0.024) -0.232*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.245*** (0.024) 0.189*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.197*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.105*** (0.054) -2.471*** (0.062) 1.877*** (0.054) 2.309*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.838 (0.631) -0.487** (0.214) 0.033 (0.203) 0.399** (0.175) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A6 
Real Wage and Satisfaction Equations with Heckman Selection (Men and Women)  
 Real Wage Satisfaction with Work Itself 
 Public Private Public Private 
     
Age 0.007*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.141** (0.063) 0.020 (0.024) -0.520*** (0.198) -0.362*** (0.074) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.020 (0.032) 0.201*** (0.007) -0.146 (0.101) -0.023 (0.021) 
Married 0.042*** (0.011) 0.135*** (0.007) 0.144*** (0.035) 0.141*** (0.021) 
Living as Couple 0.032** (0.013) 0.119*** (0.007) -0.038 (0.043) 0.033 (0.022) 
Widowed -0.084*** (0.032) -0.091*** (0.028) 0.359*** (0.103) 0.283*** (0.084) 
Divorced 0.003 (0.017) 0.052*** (0.012) -0.040 (0.055) 0.115*** (0.038) 
Higher Level Education 0.468*** (0.042) 0.398*** (0.011) -0.282** (0.133) -0.112*** (0.035) 
Medium Level Education 0.160*** (0.025) 0.142*** (0.007) -0.179** (0.080) -0.064*** (0.021) 
Health Problems -0.026*** (0.007) -0.053*** (0.004) -0.186*** (0.023) -0.117*** (0.014) 
No. of Children 0.052*** (0.004) 0.067*** (0.003) 0.023* (0.013) 0.028*** (0.008) 
Renter -0.202*** (0.014) -0.214*** (0.007) 0.102** (0.045) 0.037* (0.022) 
Medium Firm 0.055*** (0.012) 0.082*** (0.006) -0.140*** (0.037) -0.220*** (0.017) 
Large Firm 0.102*** (0.012) 0.162*** (0.006) -0.225*** (0.038) -0.315*** (0.019) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.893*** (0.200) 1.749*** (0.013) 6.820*** (0.631) 5.375*** (0.040) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 1.064*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013) 1.063*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013) 
Employer offers Pension 0.427*** (0.016) -0.348*** (0.016) 0.428*** (0.016) -0.348*** (0.016) 
Married -0.087*** (0.019) 0.084*** (0.019) -0.087*** (0.019) 0.085*** (0.019) 
Living as Couple -0.117*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021) -0.118*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021) 
Widowed 0.267*** (0.065) -0.238*** (0.064) 0.268*** (0.065) -0.237*** (0.064) 
Divorced 0.148*** (0.031) -0.135*** (0.031) 0.149*** (0.031) -0.134*** (0.031) 
Higher Level Education 0.702*** (0.018) -0.590*** (0.018) 0.703*** (0.018) -0.590*** (0.018) 
Medium Level Education 0.372*** (0.019) -0.258*** (0.019) 0.373*** (0.019) -0.258*** (0.019) 
Health Problems 0.059*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012) 0.060*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012) 
No. of Children 0.013* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) 0.013* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) 
Renter -0.100*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022) -0.100*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022) 
Medium Firm 0.133*** (0.016) -0.144*** (0.016) 0.133*** (0.016) -0.145*** (0.016) 
Large Firm 0.138*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016) 0.139*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.082*** (0.039) 1.886*** (0.039) -2.082*** (0.039) 1.886*** (0.039) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.009 (0.086) -0.050 (0.044) -0.561** (0.272) 0.290** (0.134) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A7 
Satisfaction Equations with Heckman Selection (Men and Women)  
 Satisfaction With Pay Satisfaction With Job Security  
 Public Private Public Private 
     
Age 0.014*** (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003 (0.003) -0.011*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.543** (0.237) -0.106 (0.086) 0.234 (0.234) -0.566*** (0.084) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.599*** (0.121) 0.277*** (0.025) 0.746*** (0.119) 0.153*** (0.024) 
Married 0.007 (0.042) 0.157*** (0.025) 0.046 (0.040) 0.066*** (0.024) 
Living as Couple -0.072 (0.052) 0.049* (0.026) 0.050 (0.050) 0.055** (0.025) 
Widowed 0.351*** (0.125) 0.234** (0.097) 0.096 (0.119) -0.007 (0.095) 
Divorced -0.192*** (0.067) -0.020 (0.044) -0.012 (0.064) -0.000 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.488*** (0.160) 0.139*** (0.040) 0.328** (0.157) -0.257*** (0.039) 
Medium Level Education 0.190** (0.096) 0.058** (0.025) 0.170* (0.094) -0.083*** (0.024) 
Health Problems -0.057** (0.028) -0.150*** (0.016) -0.088*** (0.027) -0.103*** (0.015) 
No. of Children 0.054*** (0.015) 0.002 (0.009) 0.003 (0.015) -0.030*** (0.009) 
Renter -0.267*** (0.054) -0.156*** (0.025) -0.253*** (0.052) 0.026 (0.024) 
Medium Firm 0.070 (0.044) -0.103*** (0.020) 0.061 (0.043) -0.226*** (0.019) 
Large Firm -0.078* (0.046) 0.025 (0.022) -0.073* (0.044) -0.335*** (0.022) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.304*** (0.755) 4.491*** (0.047) 4.463*** (0.744) 5.935*** (0.046) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 1.063*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013) 1.064*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013) 
Employer offers Pension 0.428*** (0.016) -0.347*** (0.016) 0.428*** (0.016) -0.348*** (0.016) 
Married -0.086*** (0.019) 0.085*** (0.019) -0.085*** (0.019) 0.084*** (0.019) 
Living as Couple -0.117*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021) -0.117*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021) 
Widowed 0.268*** (0.065) -0.237*** (0.064) 0.269*** (0.065) -0.239*** (0.065) 
Divorced 0.149*** (0.031) -0.134*** (0.031) 0.150*** (0.031) -0.134*** (0.031) 
Higher Level Education 0.703*** (0.018) -0.590*** (0.018) 0.703*** (0.018) -0.589*** (0.018) 
Medium Level Education 0.373*** (0.019) -0.258*** (0.019) 0.373*** (0.019) -0.257*** (0.019) 
Health Problems 0.059*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012) 0.060*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012) 
No. of Children 0.013* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) 0.012* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) 
Renter -0.100*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022) -0.101*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022) 
Medium Firm 0.133*** (0.016) -0.145*** (0.016) 0.132*** (0.016) -0.145*** (0.016) 
Large Firm 0.138*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016) 0.137*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.084*** (0.039) 1.886*** (0.039) -2.080*** (0.040) 1.887*** (0.039) 
     
Mills Ratio 0.850*** (0.325) -0.008 (0.156) 0.233 (0.321) 0.433*** (0.151) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A8 
Satisfaction Equations with Heckman Selection (Men and Women)  
 Satisfaction With Working Hours  
 Public Private   
     
Age -0.011*** (0.003) -0.002** (0.001)   
Trade Union Member -0.779*** (0.219) -0.195** (0.079)   
Employer Offers Pension  -0.012 (0.111) -0.012 (0.023)   
Married 0.013 (0.038) -0.070*** (0.023)   
Living as Couple 0.020 (0.047) -0.090*** (0.024)   
Widowed 0.012 (0.114) 0.323*** (0.090)   
Divorced -0.075 (0.061) -0.102** (0.040)   
Higher Level Education -0.751*** (0.147) -0.207*** (0.037)   
Medium Level Education -0.289*** (0.088) -0.033 (0.023)   
Health Problems -0.168*** (0.026) -0.114*** (0.015)   
No. of Children -0.015 (0.014) -0.051*** (0.009)   
Renter 0.123** (0.049) 0.034 (0.023)   
Medium Firm -0.103** (0.041) -0.093*** (0.018)   
Large Firm -0.069* (0.042) -0.059*** (0.021)   
Regional Dummies Yes Yes   
Constant 7.534*** (0.697) 5.450*** (0.043)   
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001)   
Trade Union Member 1.064*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013)   
Employer offers Pension 0.427*** (0.016) -0.348*** (0.016)   
Married -0.086*** (0.019) 0.085*** (0.019)   
Living as Couple -0.117*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021)   
Widowed 0.268*** (0.065) -0.237*** (0.064)   
Divorced 0.149*** (0.031) -0.134*** (0.031)   
Higher Level Education 0.702*** (0.018) -0.590*** (0.018)   
Medium Level Education 0.372*** (0.019) -0.258*** (0.019)   
Health Problems 0.060*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012)   
No. of Children 0.013* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007)   
Renter -0.100*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022)   
Medium Firm 0.133*** (0.016) -0.145*** (0.016)   
Large Firm 0.138*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016)   
Regional Dummies Yes Yes   
Constant -2.081*** (0.039) 1.886*** (0.039)   
     
Mills Ratio -0.668** (0.300) 0.278* (0.143)   
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table B1  
Differential Correlations (for both men and women) 
  ityˆ   )(ˆ PAYits   )(ˆ SECits   )(ˆ WORKits   )(ˆ HOURSits  
ityˆ   1.000  
    
)(ˆ PAYits   -0.022 (0.000) 
1.000 
 
   
)(ˆ SECits   -0.261 (0.000) 
0.875 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
  
)(ˆ WORKits   -0.062 (0.000) 
-0.746 
(0.000) 
-0.719 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
 
)(ˆ HOURSits   -0.160 (0.000) 
-0.828 
(0.000) 
-0.825 
(0.000) 
0.717 
(0.000) 
1.000 
The p values are given in brackets (). 
 
Table B2 
Differential Correlations (for men) 
  ityˆ   )(ˆ PAYits   )(ˆ SECits   )(ˆ WORKits   )(ˆ HOURSits  
ityˆ   1.000  
    
)(ˆ PAYits   0.645 (0.000) 
1.000    
)(ˆ SECits   -0.908 (0.000) 
-0.442 
(0.000) 
1.000   
)(ˆ WORKits   0.893 (0.000) 
0.622 
(0.000) 
-0.877 
(0.000) 
1.000  
)(ˆ HOURSits   0.808 (0.000) 
0.633 
(0.000) 
-0.785 
(0.000) 
0.904 
(0.000) 
1.000 
The p values are given in brackets (). 
 
Table B3 
Differential Correlations (for women) 
  ityˆ   )(ˆ PAYits   )(ˆ SECits   )(ˆ WORKits   )(ˆ HOURSits  
ityˆ   1.000     
)(ˆ PAYits   0.700 (0.000) 
1.000    
)(ˆ SECits   0.515 (0.000) 
0.748 
(0.000) 
1.000   
)(ˆ WORKits   0.216 (0.000) 
0.389 
(0.000) 
0.577 
(0.000) 
1.000  
)(ˆ HOURSits   -0.712 (0.000) 
-0.497 
(0.000) 
-0.508 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.607) 
1.000 
The p values are given in brackets (). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B4 
Probit results for transition into Public and Private Sectors  
 Public Private 
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 Males Females Males Females 
     
ityˆ  -2.148*** (0.706) -1.269*** (0.437) -1.063 (0.876) 1.514** (0.594) 
)(ˆ SECits  -0.470** (0.184) 0.347** (0.166) 0.123 (0.219) 0.315 (0.244) 
)(ˆ WORKits  0.579*** (0.213) 0.890*** (0.331) 0.067 (0.242) -0.089 (0.468) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -0.937*** (0.283) -0.608** (0.244) -0.032 (0.335) 0.611* (0.360) 
Employer offers Pension (t) 0.239 (0.151) 0.192 (0.143) 0.343* (0.185) -0.201 (0.188) 
Age (t-1) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.005) -0.007* (0.004) -0.012* (0.006) 
Pension (t-1) -0.220*** (0.060) -0.267*** (0.062) -0.409*** (0.079) -0.342*** (0.077) 
Trade Union Member (t-1) -0.068 (0.076) 0.234*** (0.077) 0.035 (0.082) 0.209** (0.083) 
Married (t-1) -0.254*** (0.086) -0.237*** (0.086) -0.061 (0.099) -0.121 (0.109) 
Living as Couple (t-1) -0.128 (0.087) -0.215*** (0.081) -0.103 (0.110) 0.065 (0.102) 
Widowed (t-1) 0.076 (0.437) -0.367 (0.333) 0.021 (0.509) -0.363 (0.332) 
Divorced (t-1) 0.145 (0.164) -0.128 (0.129) -0.122 (0.189) -0.020 (0.149) 
Higher Level Edu (t-1) 0.058 (0.079) 0.274** (0.110) -0.132 (0.101) -0.221 (0.153) 
Medium Level Edu (t-1) 0.074 (0.071) 0.172** (0.088) -0.024 (0.096) -0.084 (0.116) 
Health Problems (t-1) 0.016 (0.053) 0.112** (0.054) -0.053 (0.063) 0.141** (0.066) 
No. of Children (t-1)  0.101*** (0.033) 0.051 (0.037) -0.001 (0.040) 0.026 (0.041) 
Renter (t-1) 0.143** (0.072) 0.267*** (0.090) 0.197** (0.099) 0.070 (0.131) 
Medium Firm (t-1) -0.018 (0.069) -0.109* (0.066) 0.077 (0.096) 0.123 (0.091) 
Large Firm (t-1)  -0.089 (0.074) -0.299*** (0.079) 0.209** (0.095) 0.150 (0.101) 
Regional Dummies (t-1) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -2.151*** (0.452) -3.723*** (0.420) -2.551*** (0.537) -1.848*** (0.641) 
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.107 0.096 0.117 
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. Note on differential*****. 
 
 
 
 
Table B5 
Probit results for Transition – Caring and Non Caring Jobs (Men and Women) 
 Public 
 Caring Non Caring 
   
ityˆ  -1.343 (0.834) -1.123 (0.734) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.084 (0.191) 0.048 (0.175) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.248*** (0.390) 1.428*** (0.368) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -1.168*** (0.357) -1.112*** (0.321) 
   
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B6 
Probit results for Transition – Government Sub-sectors (Men and Women) 
 Central Government Local Government NHS And Higher Education 
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ityˆ  -1.029 (0.982) 0.078 (0.756) -2.798*** (0.814) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.164 (0.233) 0.045 (0.175) -0.136 (0.190) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.299*** (0.493) 1.325*** (0.367) 0.947** (0.391) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -0.811* (0.425) -0.893*** (0.334) -1.395*** (0.352) 
    
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
 
Table B7 
Probit results for Transition into Public Sector– Income (Men and Women) 
 Lowest 25th Percentile  
(<£910.00/month) 
Highest 25th Percentile  
(>£1833.33/month) 
   
ityˆ  -2.447** (1.105) -0.433 (1.152) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.471* (0.268) 0.017 (0.273) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.574*** (0.513) 1.069* (0.589) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -1.046** (0.504) -0.763 (0.488) 
   
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. ^ indicates significance at a 10.2% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
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Figure1. Transition from private to public sector (Men)
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Figure 2. Transition from private to public sector (Women)
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Number of years before and after transition
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Figure 3. Transition from public to private sector (Men)
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Figure 4. Transition from public to private sector (Women)
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Figure 5. Transition from public sector to new public sector job (Men)
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Figure 6. Transition from a public sector job to a new public sector job (Women)
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Figure 7. Transition from private sector job to new private sector job (Men)
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Figure 8. Transition from private sector job to new private sector job (Women)
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 Number of observations of Lags and Leads 
 Entry into Public 
Sector from 
Private Sector 
Entry into 
Private Sector 
from Public 
Sector 
 
Entry into New 
Public Sector 
Job from Public 
Sector Job 
 
Entry into New 
Private Sector 
Job from Private 
Sector Job 
 
 Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females 
         
Leads         
3-4 years 
hence 
225 245 295 253 386 601 2,682 1,157 
2-3 years 
hence 
295 290 356 295 489 771 3,284 1,513 
1-2 years 
hence 
339 351 393 354 581 910 3,905 1,897 
Within the 
next year 
457 496 487 472 744 1,230 5,159 2,706 
Lags         
0-1 years 449 495 493 479 744 1,234 5,213 2,791 
1-2 years 298 325 391 358 499 820 2,930 1,537 
2-3 years 232 232 220 177 367 600 1,898 943 
3-4 years 167 183 162 122 267 403 1,223 573 
4-5 years 108 125 125 90 187 264 820 385 
5 or more 
years 
352 293 450 281 499 579 1,942 781 
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Table 2 
The Distribution of Job Satisfaction Measures 
 
 
MALES 
 
 
Rank 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The Work 
Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Count % Count  % Count % Count % Count % 
1 796 1.75 827 1.82 1,962 4.32 1,725 3.80 1,118 2.46 
2 1,443 3.18 1,237 2.72 2,480 5.46 1,540 3.39 1,631 3.59 
3 3,437 7.57 2,908 6.41 6,597 14.53 3,541 7.80 4,929 10.86 
4 4,369 9.62 4,145 9.13 4,393 9.68 4,471 9.85 5,843 12.87 
5 11,046 24.33 9,840 21.68 11,681 25.73 8,713 19.19 10,412 22.94 
6 19,722 43.44 19,002 41.86 14,966 32.97 16,157 35.59 16,033 35.32 
7 4,584 10.10 7,438 16.38 3,318 7.31 9,250 20.38 5,431 11.96 
Total 45,397 100.00 45,397 100.00 45,397 100.00 45,397 100.00 45,397 100.00 
 
FEMALES 
 
 
Rank 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The Work 
Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Count % Count  % Count % Count % Count % 
1 522 1.60 526 1.61 1,402 4.28 1,026 3.14 619 1.89 
2 887 2.71 838 2.56 1,830 5.59 829 2.53 995 3.04 
3 2,142 6.55 2,043 6.24 4,720 14.42 2,196 6.71 3,703 11.31 
4 2,072 6.33 2,169 6.63 2,481 7.58 2,259 6.90 2,962 9.05 
5 7,192 21.98 6,729 20.56 8,039 24.56 5,632 17.21 7,481 22.86 
6 15,500 47.36 14,219 43.45 11,230 34.31 12,355 37.75 12,159 37.15 
7 4,412 13.48 6,203 18.95 3,025 9.24 8,430 25.76 4,808 14.69 
Total 32,727 100.00 32,727 100.00 32,727 100.00 32,727 100.00 32,727 100.00 
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Table 3 
Mean Overall Job Satisfaction, Satisfaction with Work Itself and Satisfaction with Pay 
 
 
Mean Job Satisfaction Mean Satisfaction with Work Itself Mean Satisfaction with Pay 
Stayers Changing Job 
within the next 
year 
In new job for 
0-1 years 
Stayers Changing Job 
within the next 
year 
In new job for 
0-1 years 
Stayers Changing Job 
within the next 
year 
In new job for 
0-1 years 
Men          
Private to 
public 
5.224 [4.880]*** 5.343** 5.372 [5.059]*** 5.388 4.783 [4.444]*** [4.777] 
Public to 
private 
5.283 [4.965]*** 
 
[5.172]** 
 
5.417 [5.090]*** [5.347] 4.709 [4.515]*** 4.793 
Public to 
public 
5.235 [5.173] 
 
5.380*** 
 
5.360 [5.317] 5.469** 4.633 [4.591] 4.910*** 
Private to 
private 
5.259 [4.978]*** 
 
5.328*** 
 
5.411 [5.194]*** 5.456** 4.739 [4.568]*** 4.952*** 
 
Women 
         
Private to 
public 
5.376 [4.940]*** 
 
5.541*** 
 
5.440 [5.109]*** 5.638*** 4.796 [4.393]*** 5.028*** 
Public to 
private 
5.455 [5.388] 
 
[5.405] 
 
5.541 [5.508] [5.499] 4.892 [4.867] 4.948 
Public to 
public 
5.452 [5.394]* 
 
5.638*** 
 
5.550 [5.500] 5.647*** 4.854 [4.802] 5.072*** 
Private to 
private 
5.403 [5.180]*** 
 
5.418 
 
5.478 [5.275]*** [5.427]** 4.761 [4.616]*** 4.954*** 
          
Notes: Mean satisfaction scores less than the corresponding mean satisfaction for stayers are given in square parentheses, i.e. [].  ***indicates significance at a 1% confidence 
level, **indicates significance at a 5% confidence level, and *indicates significance at a 10% confidence level for difference with job stayers mean satisfaction.   
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Table 3 Continued 
Mean Overall Job Satisfaction, Satisfaction with Work Itself and Satisfaction with Pay 
 
 
Mean Satisfaction with Job Security Mean Satisfaction with Hours Worked 
Stayers Changing Job within 
the next year 
In new job for 0-1 
years 
Stayers Changing Job within 
the next year 
In new job for 0-1 
years 
Men       
Private to 
public 
5.262 [4.757]*** [5.209] 5.003 [4.930] 5.372*** 
Public to 
private 
5.409 [4.791]*** [5.158]*** 5.203 5.232 [5.120]* 
Public to 
public 
5.324 [5.280] 5.464** 5.229 [5.133]** 5.204 
Private to 
private 
5.290 [5.013]*** [5.243]** 5.054 [4.863]*** 5.082 
 
Women 
      
Private to 
public 
5.465 [5.028]*** 5.446 5.186 [5.071]** 5.535*** 
Public to 
private 
5.579 [5.269]*** [5.357]*** 5.158 5.405*** 5.265* 
Public to 
public 
5.546 [5.428]*** 5.724*** 5.208 [5.169] 5.231 
Private to 
private 
5.511 [5.237]*** [5.440]** 5.239 [5.109]*** [5.222] 
       
Notes: Mean satisfaction scores less than the corresponding mean satisfaction for stayers are given in square parentheses, i.e. [].  ***indicates significance at a 1% confidence 
level, **indicates significance at a 5% confidence level, and *indicates significance at a 10% confidence level for difference with job stayers mean satisfaction.   
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Table 4 
Fixed effect satisfaction regressions - transitions into the public sector  
 
 
Males Females 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The 
Work Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The 
Work Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Leads           
3-4 years 
hence 
-0.170** 
 (0.078) 
-0.084 
(0.078) 
-0.114 
(0.087) 
-0.185** 
(0.091) 
-0.122 
(0.084) 
-0.104 
(0.076) 
0.001 
(0.077) 
0.130 
(0.086) 
-0.084 
(0.087) 
0.010 
(0.080) 
2-3 years 
hence 
-0.065 
(0.070) 
-0.016 
(0.070) 
-0.099 
(0.077) 
-0.243*** 
(0.081) 
-0.069 
(0.075) 
-0.037 
(0.071) 
-0.097 
(0.071) 
-0.031 
(0.080) 
-0.255*** 
(0.081) 
-0.006 
(0.074) 
1-2 years 
hence 
-0.269*** 
(0.066) 
-0.228*** 
(0.066) 
-0.146** 
(0.073) 
-0.466*** 
(0.076) 
-0.151** 
(0.070) 
-0.071 
(0.065) 
-0.098 
(0.066) 
-0.003 
(0.074) 
-0.155** 
(0.074) 
-0.185*** 
(0.068) 
Within the 
next year 
-0.298*** 
(0.057) 
-0.211*** 
(0.057) 
-0.177*** 
(0.063) 
-0.468*** 
(0.066) 
-0.267*** 
(0.061) 
-0.511*** 
(0.056) 
-0.414*** 
(0.056) 
-0.335*** 
(0.063) 
-0.480*** 
(0.063) 
-0.302*** 
(0.058) 
 
Lags 
          
0-1 years 0.322*** 
(0.063) 
0.262*** 
(0.064) 
0.319*** 
(0.071) 
0.128* 
(0.074) 
0.229*** 
(0.068) 
0.285*** 
(0.061) 
0.269*** 
(0.062) 
0.400*** 
(0.070) 
0.116* 
(0.070) 
0.309*** 
(0.064) 
1-2 years 0.309*** 
(0.073) 
0.324*** 
(0.073) 
0.306*** 
(0.081) 
0.257*** 
(0.085) 
0.204*** 
(0.078) 
0.391*** 
(0.072) 
0.280*** 
(0.073) 
0.104 
(0.082) 
0.237*** 
(0.082) 
0.185** 
(0.076) 
2-3 years 0.264*** 
(0.081) 
0.110 
(0.081) 
0.207** 
(0.090) 
0.257*** 
(0.094) 
0.146* 
(0.087) 
0.397*** 
(0.082) 
0.303*** 
(0.083) 
0.119 
(0.093) 
0.359*** 
(0.094) 
0.192** 
(0.086) 
3-4 years 0.293*** 
(0.094) 
0.281*** 
(0.094) 
0.108 
(0.104) 
0.168 
(0.109) 
0.230** 
(0.100) 
0.286*** 
(0.091) 
0.278*** 
(0.092) 
0.102 
(0.104) 
0.296*** 
(0.104) 
0.074 
(0.096) 
4-5 years 0.188* 
(0.114) 
0.252** 
(0.114) 
0.121 
(0.127) 
-0.049 
(0.132) 
-0.027 
(0.122) 
0.279*** 
(0.108) 
0.263** 
(0.109) 
0.162 
(0.122) 
0.386*** 
(0.123) 
0.060 
(0.113) 
5 or more 
years 
0.248*** 
(0.081) 
0.173** 
(0.081) 
0.272*** 
(0.090) 
0.183** 
(0.094) 
0.093 
(0.087) 
0.175** 
(0.086) 
0.120 
(0.087) 
0.052 
(0.098) 
0.238** 
(0.099) 
0.144 
(0.091) 
Notes: The standard errors are given in brackets.  *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% confidence level, * indicates 
significance at a 10% confidence level.   
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Table 5 
Fixed effect satisfaction regressions - transitions into the private sector  
 
 
Males Females 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The 
Work Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The 
Work Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Leads           
3-4 years 
hence 
0.061 
 (0.069) 
-0.024 
(0.069) 
-0.062 
(0.076) 
-0.029 
(0.080) 
0.020 
(0.073) 
0.134* 
(0.076) 
-0.012 
(0.077) 
-0.006 
(0.086) 
0.131 
(0.087) 
0.035 
(0.080) 
2-3 years 
hence 
-0.014 
(0.064) 
-0.038 
(0.064) 
0.020 
(0.071) 
-0.162** 
(0.074) 
0.030 
(0.068) 
0.036 
(0.072) 
0.056 
(0.072) 
0.036 
(0.081) 
0.065 
(0.082) 
0.006 
(0.075) 
1-2 years 
hence 
-0.116* 
(0.061) 
-0.128** 
(0.061) 
-0.056 
(0.068) 
-0.224*** 
(0.071) 
0.083 
(0.065) 
0.012 
(0.066) 
0.004 
(0.067) 
0.015 
(0.075) 
-0.054 
(0.075) 
0.123* 
(0.069) 
Within the 
next year 
-0.179*** 
(0.055) 
-0.168*** 
(0.055) 
-0.155** 
(0.061) 
-0.374*** 
(0.064) 
0.131** 
(0.059) 
-0.011 
(0.058) 
-0.010 
(0.058) 
0.035 
(0.065) 
-0.229*** 
(0.066) 
0.158*** 
(0.060) 
 
Lags 
          
0-1 years 0.316*** 
(0.061) 
0.312*** 
(0.061) 
0.248*** 
(0.068) 
0.286*** 
(0.071) 
0.172*** 
(0.066) 
0.238*** 
(0.065) 
0.196*** 
(0.066) 
0.095 
(0.073) 
0.116 
(0.074) 
0.123** 
(0.068) 
1-2 years 0.303*** 
(0.064) 
0.192*** 
(0.064) 
0.184*** 
(0.071) 
0.182** 
(0.074) 
0.070 
(0.068) 
0.065 
(0.068) 
0.089 
(0.069) 
-0.001 
(0.077) 
0.102 
(0.077) 
-0.042 
(0.071) 
2-3 years 0.307*** 
(0.083) 
0.199** 
(0.083) 
0.258*** 
(0.092) 
0.182* 
(0.096) 
0.123 
(0.089) 
0.089 
(0.093) 
0.024 
(0.094) 
0.045 
(0.105) 
0.339*** 
(0.106) 
-0.059 
(0.097) 
3-4 years 0.182** 
(0.094) 
0.046 
(0.094) 
0.224** 
(0.105) 
0.334*** 
(0.109) 
0.017 
(0.101) 
0.063 
(0.109) 
0.081 
(0.110) 
-0.022 
(0.123) 
0.291** 
(0.124) 
-0.079 
(0.114) 
4-5 years 0.125 
(0.106) 
0.106 
(0.106) 
0.259** 
(0.118) 
0.385*** 
(0.123) 
0.109 
(0.114) 
0.054 
(0.126) 
0.022 
(0.127) 
-0.092 
(0.142) 
0.038 
(0.143) 
-0.004 
(0.132) 
5 or more 
years 
0.258*** 
(0.073) 
0.158** 
(0.073) 
0.196** 
(0.081) 
0.318*** 
(0.085) 
0.137* 
(0.078) 
0.017 
(0.091) 
-0.021 
(0.092) 
-0.106 
(0.103) 
0.274*** 
(0.104) 
-0.158* 
(0.095) 
Notes: The standard errors are given in brackets.  *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% confidence level, * indicates 
significance at a 10% confidence level.   
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Table 6 
Fixed effect satisfaction regressions – transition from public sector job to new public sector job  
 
 
Males Females 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The 
Work Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The 
Work Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Leads           
3-4 years 
hence 
0.049 
 (0.062) 
0.061 
(0.064) 
0.020 
(0.068) 
0.113 
(0.073) 
0.085 
(0.064) 
0.108** 
(0.049) 
0.089* 
(0.050) 
-0.052 
(0.056) 
0.036 
(0.058) 
0.007 
(0.053) 
2-3 years 
hence 
0.011 
(0.055) 
-0.005 
(0.057) 
-0.096 
(0.060) 
-0.080 
(0.065) 
-0.086 
(0.057) 
-0.017 
(0.043) 
-0.002 
(0.044) 
-0.143*** 
(0.049) 
-0.047 
(0.051) 
0.054 
(0.046) 
1-2 years 
hence 
-0.007 
(0.050) 
-0.096* 
(0.052) 
-0.108** 
(0.055) 
0.009 
(0.059) 
-0.058 
(0.052) 
-0.053 
(0.040) 
0.014 
(0.040) 
-0.096** 
(0.045) 
-0.008 
(0.047) 
-0.001 
(0.042) 
Within the 
next year 
-0.164*** 
(0.043) 
-0.131*** 
(0.045) 
-0.186*** 
(0.047) 
-0.210*** 
(0.051) 
-0.033 
(0.045) 
-0.163*** 
(0.034) 
-0.103*** 
(0.035) 
-0.112*** 
(0.039) 
-0.221*** 
(0.040) 
-0.041 
(0.036) 
 
Lags 
          
0-1 years 0.195*** 
(0.051) 
0.217*** 
(0.053) 
0.201*** 
(0.056) 
0.103* 
(0.061) 
0.103* 
(0.053) 
0.232*** 
(0.039) 
0.143*** 
(0.040) 
0.151*** 
(0.044) 
0.238*** 
(0.046) 
0.073* 
(0.042) 
1-2 years 0.166*** 
(0.061) 
0.241*** 
(0.063) 
0.146** 
(0.066) 
0.184*** 
(0.072) 
0.040 
(0.063) 
0.068 
(0.046) 
0.009 
(0.047) 
0.008 
(0.053) 
0.171*** 
(0.055) 
-0.027 
(0.050) 
2-3 years 0.006 
(0.069) 
0.138* 
(0.072) 
0.043 
(0.076) 
0.088 
(0.082) 
-0.095 
(0.072) 
-0.001 
(0.053) 
0.013 
(0.054) 
-0.021 
(0.061) 
0.104* 
(0.063) 
-0.060 
(0.057) 
3-4 years 0.031 
(0.080) 
0.152* 
(0.083) 
0.027 
(0.088) 
-0.070 
(0.095) 
0.029 
(0.083) 
0.030 
(0.064) 
-0.009 
(0.065) 
0.082 
(0.073) 
0.151** 
(0.076) 
-0.016 
(0.069) 
4-5 years 0.111 
(0.094) 
0.268*** 
(0.097) 
0.143 
(0.103) 
0.079 
(0.112) 
0.080 
(0.097) 
-0.005 
(0.078) 
-0.007 
(0.079) 
0.046 
(0.089) 
0.085 
(0.092) 
-0.071 
(0.083) 
5 or more 
years 
0.067 
(0.082) 
0.167** 
(0.084) 
0.073 
(0.090) 
0.110 
(0.097) 
0.140* 
(0.084) 
-0.095 
(0.068) 
-0.042 
(0.069) 
-0.083 
(0.077) 
-0.004 
(0.080) 
-0.012 
(0.072) 
Notes: The standard errors are given in brackets.  *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% confidence level, * indicates 
significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table 7 
Fixed effect satisfaction regressions – transition from private sector job to new private sector job  
 
 
Males Females 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The 
Work Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The 
Work Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
Leads           
3-4 years 
hence 
-0.087*** 
 (0.025) 
-0.077*** 
(0.025) 
-0.036 
(0.028) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
-0.079*** 
(0.027) 
-0.067* 
(0.039) 
-0.084** 
(0.040) 
-0.055 
(0.044) 
-0.083* 
(0.044) 
0.025 
(0.041) 
2-3 years 
hence 
-0.040* 
(0.023) 
-0.043* 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.025) 
0.014 
(0.026) 
-0.020 
(0.024) 
-0.012 
(0.035) 
-0.019 
(0.035) 
-0.097** 
(0.039) 
-0.074* 
(0.038) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
1-2 years 
hence 
-0.100*** 
(0.021) 
-0.062*** 
(0.021) 
-0.126*** 
(0.023) 
-0.085*** 
(0.024) 
-0.071*** 
(0.023) 
-0.014 
(0.031) 
-0.025 
(0.032) 
-0.001 
(0.035) 
-0.039 
(0.035) 
0.011 
(0.033) 
Within the 
next year 
-0.292*** 
(0.018) 
-0.181*** 
(0.019) 
-0.217*** 
(0.021) 
-0.252*** 
(0.021) 
-0.156*** 
(0.020) 
-0.220*** 
(0.027) 
-0.163*** 
(0.027) 
-0.194*** 
(0.030) 
-0.243*** 
(0.030) 
-0.069** 
(0.028) 
 
Lags 
          
0-1 years 0.275*** 
(0.022) 
0.221*** 
(0.022) 
0.286*** 
(0.025) 
0.097*** 
(0.026) 
0.219*** 
(0.024) 
0.143*** 
(0.032) 
0.093*** 
(0.032) 
0.166*** 
(0.036) 
0.121*** 
(0.035) 
0.103*** 
(0.033) 
1-2 years 0.148*** 
(0.027) 
0.064** 
(0.027) 
0.129*** 
(0.030) 
0.131*** 
(0.031) 
0.090*** 
(0.029) 
0.012 
(0.039) 
0.024 
(0.039) 
-0.067 
(0.044) 
0.123*** 
(0.043) 
-0.025 
(0.041) 
2-3 years 0.036 
(0.032) 
0.009 
(0.032) 
0.071** 
(0.036) 
0.068* 
(0.037) 
0.030 
(0.034) 
-0.035 
(0.047) 
0.010 
(0.048) 
-0.035 
(0.053) 
0.110** 
(0.052) 
-0.081 
(0.049) 
3-4 years 0.042 
(0.038) 
-0.052* 
(0.038) 
0.097** 
(0.043) 
0.037 
(0.044) 
0.029 
(0.041) 
0.004 
(0.059) 
0.033 
(0.059) 
-0.059 
(0.066) 
0.189*** 
(0.065) 
-0.108* 
(0.061) 
4-5 years -0.025 
(0.045) 
-0.071 
(0.046) 
0.045 
(0.051) 
0.013 
(0.052) 
-0.078 
(0.049) 
-0.104 
(0.071) 
-0.164** 
(0.072) 
-0.069 
(0.080) 
0.043 
(0.079) 
-0.135* 
(0.074) 
5 or more 
years 
0.011 
(0.040) 
-0.059 
(0.040) 
0.032 
(0.044) 
0.029 
(0.046) 
0.008 
(0.043) 
-0.177*** 
(0.064) 
-0.172*** 
(0.065) 
-0.090 
(0.072) 
-0.036 
(0.071) 
-0.248*** 
(0.067) 
Notes: The standard errors are given in brackets.  *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% confidence level, * indicates 
significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
 
Comparative Statics Proof for Conditions (2) and (3) 
 
I consider an example to show that the competent decision maker will step in 
whenever the project is good and he will not step in when the project is bad. I make 
some comparative statics analysis to prove this.  
 
I propose an equilibrium where the incompetent decision maker steps in when the 
project is good and does not step in when the project is bad. I use simulations to show 
the parameter values where the competent decision maker will always step in when 
the project is good and not step in when the project is bad.  
 
For good projects, in equilibrium I have; 
 
 (2) 
 
With the left hand side (LHS) = , this is the expected reputational 
payoff from stepping in. The right hand side (RHS) = , this is the 
expected reputational payoff from not stepping in. In equilibrium, the expected payoff 
for a competent decision maker from stepping in on a good project must be larger 
than the reputational payoff from not stepping in. 
 
For bad projects, in equilibrium I have;  
 
 (3) 
 
With the left hand side (LHS) = , this is the expected reputational 
payoff from not stepping in. The right hand side (RHS) =  , is the expected 
reputational payoff from stepping in. In equilibrium, the expected payoff for a 
competent decision maker from not stepping in on a bad project must be greater than 
the expected reputational payoff from stepping in.  
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I begin by deriving the equilibrium value of z for the following parameter values; 
. I derive z from the mixed strategy 
condition of the incompetent decision maker, which is; 
 
. (4) 
 
For the given parameter values, the equilibrium value of z is illustrated in Figure 9 
below. The equilibrium value of z for the stated parameter values is 0.45.  
 
I now check whether the equilibrium strategies of the competent decision maker will 
hold for the given parameter values ( ) 
and for . If the project is good,  
 
. (2) 
 
For the given parameter values, the LHS of (2) = 0.5716 and the RHS of (2) = 0.4740. 
Therefore inequality (2) holds true.  
 
If the project is bad,  
 
 (3) 
 
For the given parameter values, the LHS of (3) = 0.4805 and the RHS of (3) = 0.3893. 
Therefore inequality (3) holds true.  
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Figure 9. Equilibrium value of z for given parameter values (LHS=black, 
RHS=blue). 
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I now continue by investigating whether the equilibrium strategy of the competent 
decision maker holds true for different parameter values.   
 
I begin by analysing how the LHS and RHS of inequalities (2) and (3) vary with r. 
For the given parameter values ( ), using 
equation (4), when r takes the values 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9 (since I assume ). 
This results in z having equilibrium values of 0.45, 0.44, 0.41, and 0.36 respectively. 
At these values, the respective values of the LHS of inequality (2) are 0.57, 0.59, 0.62, 
and 0.68. The respective values of the RHS of inequality (2) are 0.47, 0.47, 0.45, and 
0.43. At these values, the respective values of the LHS of inequality (3) are 0.48, 0.47, 
0.46, and 0.44. The respective values of the RHS of inequality (3) are 0.39, 0.34, 0.29, 
and 0.20. These results show that for the given parameter values, the LHS is greater 
than the RHS, conditions (2) and (3) hold true for different values of r. They also 
show that increasing values of r (and so the larger r is over s) than the larger the value 
of the LHS over the RHS. This makes intuitive sense since a large r means that the 
decision maker has a higher probability of achieving outcome V on a good project.  
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I now analyse how the LHS and RHS of inequalities (2) and (3) vary with s. For the 
given parameter values ( ), using equation (4), 
when s takes the values 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1 (since I assume ). This results in z 
having equilibrium values of 0.45, 0.46, 0.46, and 0.47 respectively. At these values, 
the respective values of the LHS of inequality (2) are 0.56, 0.56, 0.56, and 0.56. The 
respective values of the RHS of inequality (2) are 0.47, 0.46, 0.45, and 0.42. At these 
values, the respective values of the LHS of inequality (3) are 0.48, 0.49, 0.49, and 
0.51. The respective values of the RHS of inequality (3) are 0.39, 0.38, 0.38, and 0.38. 
These results show that for the given parameter values, the LHS is greater than the 
RHS, conditions (2) and (3) hold true for different values of s. They also show that 
decreasing values of s (and so the larger r is over s) than the larger the value of the 
LHS over the RHS. This makes intuitive sense since a large r means that the decision 
maker has a higher probability of achieving outcome V on a good project. This makes 
intuitive sense since a smaller s means the private firm is increasingly less likely to 
achieve outcome V, thus making it more worthwhile for the decision maker to step in. 
 
Overall these comparative statics show that for both inequalities (2) and (3), 
increasing r or decreasing s (i.e. increasing the value of r over s) results in an increase 
in the LHS over the RHS of both inequalities. For the given parameter values, the 
both inequalities clearly hold true.  
 
I now analyse how the LHS and RHS of inequalities (2) and (3) vary with g. For the 
given parameter values ( ), using equation (4), 
when g takes the values 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. This results in z having equilibrium 
values of 0.09, 0.23, 0.45, 0.69, and 0.90 respectively. At these values, the respective 
values of the LHS of inequality (2) are 0.68, 0.64, 0.57, 0.52, and 0.50. The respective 
values of the RHS of inequality (2) are 0.47, 0.47, 0.47, 0.49, and 0.49. At these 
values, the respective values of the LHS of inequality (3) are 0.50, 0.47, 0.48, 0.50, 
and 0.51. The respective values of the RHS of inequality (3) are 0.31, 0.39, 0.39, 0.41, 
and 0.47. These results show that for the given parameter values, the LHS is greater 
than the RHS, conditions (2) and (3) hold true for different values of g. They also 
show that for increasing values of g, then the smaller the value of the LHS over the 
RHS.  
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I now analyse how the LHS and RHS of inequalities (2) and (3) vary with γ. For the 
given parameter values ( ), using equation (4), 
when γ takes the values 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. This results in z having equilibrium 
values of 0.50, 0.47, 0.45, 0.44, and 0.42 respectively. At these values, the respective 
values of the LHS of inequality (2) are 0.14, 0.37, 0.57, 0.74, and 0.92. The respective 
values of the RHS of inequality (2) are 0.10, 0.29, 0.47, 0.67, and 0.88. At these 
values, the respective values of the LHS of inequality (3) are 0.10, 0.29, 0.48, 0.66, 
and 0.88. The respective values of the RHS of inequality (3) are 0.06, 0.21, 0.39, 0.60, 
and 0.86. For both inequality (2) and (3), for each increase in γ, the LHS is greater 
than the RHS. This shows that both inequalities (2) and (3) hold for any given value 
of γ. 
 
I now analyse how the LHS and RHS of inequalities (2) and (3) vary with p.38 For the 
given parameter values ( ), using equation (4), 
when p takes the values 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. This results in z having equilibrium 
values of 0.48, 0.46, 0.45, 0.46, and 0.50 respectively. At these values, the respective 
values of the LHS of inequality (2) are 0.55, 0.57, 0.57, 0.57, and 0.55. The respective 
values of the RHS of inequality (2) are 0.43, 0.47, 0.47, 0.45, and 0.36. At these 
values, the respective values of the LHS of inequality (3) are 0.51, 0.48, 0.48, 0.49, 
and 0.55. The respective values of the RHS of inequality (3) are 0.37, 0.38, 0.39, 0.38, 
and 0.36. For both inequality (2) and (3), the LHS is always greater than the RHS for 
all values of p. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Of course, p (in equation 5) is endogenous and depends on the parameters of the model (such as  γ 
and all the parameters affecting z, i.e. r, s, and g ) but we can give values to p for simulation purposes 
given that p also depends on  k and there is always a level of k that makes the value attached to p 
consistent with the remaining parameter values. 
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Figure 1. How the expected reputational gain from stepping in (LHS) varies with 
g. 
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Figure 2. How the expected reputational gain from not stepping in (RHS) varies 
with g. 
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Figure 3. How the expected reputational gain from stepping in (LHS) varies with 
γ. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1z  
 
 
Figure 4. How the expected reputational gain from not stepping in (RHS) varies 
with γ. 
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Figure 5. How the expected reputational gain from stepping in (LHS) varies with 
r. 
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Figure 6. How the expected reputational gain from not stepping in (RHS) varies 
with r. 
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Figure 7. How the expected reputational gain from stepping in (LHS) varies with 
s. 
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Figure 8. How the expected reputational gain from not stepping in (RHS) varies 
with s. 
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